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ABSTRACT
Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities
(September, 1979)

Marcia Ann McKelligan, A.B., Mount Holyoke College
M.A.

,

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
The dissertation is an attempt to discover whether

Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities
is a justified and useful one.

It is a search for a primary-

secondary quality distinction which is suggested by Locke,
yields results in accord with Locke's and has defensible

implications about the nature and properties of physical
Ob j ects

Chapter

I

briefly examines the history of the distinc-

tion and argues that it is possible to isolate in the

Lockean text five separate versions of the distinction.
Chapter II examines various versions of the view that
the primary qualities of macroscopic objects are essential
to them while their secondary qualities are not.

It

argues that the chief problem with these views lies in the

difficulty of establishing that none of the secondary
the physical objects that have

qualities is essential to
it.

The suggestion is made that at least some of the tra-

ditional secondary qualities are in fact essential to

physical objects.
V

chapter III examines two sets of proposals.

First,

it examines versions of a primary-secondary quality dis-

tinction which identify the primary qualities as the
real

properties of physical objects and the secondary

qualities as those which are instantiated only by mental
entities.

It is argued that this view is impossible to

defend in a non-question— begging way.

The second pro-

posal examined is the view that sense-data associated

with the primary qualities resemble physical objects
in some way that the sense-data associated with the secon-

dary qualities do not.

It is argued that this view is

largely incoherent.

Chapter IV discusses the suggestion that objects can

gain and lose secondary qualities without undergoing any
physical alteration while primary quality changes require

physical alteration of objects.

This view is dismissed

on the grounds that it makes tacit assumptions about the

nature of secondary qualities which, if made explicit,

would constitute part of one of the other versions of the
primary-secondary quality distinction.
Chapter V discusses various proposals that the

secondary qualities are dispositions.

These proposals

suggest either that primary qualities are non-dispositional
or that they are dispositions of a different sort from the

secondary qualities.

Here it is argued that it is difficult
VI

to find a good argument to show that secondary qualities

dispositions that does not tend to show that primary
qualities, also, are dispositions.
if

Further, it is argued,

the properties of physical objects are considered

dispositions, it becomes difficult to distinguish among
them in a suitably Lockean way.

Chapter VI examines a set of proposals loosely con-

nected with the notion of property dependency.

The most

meritorious of these is the view that the primary qualities
of objects are those which are physically essential to

their microconstituents and that the secondary qualities
of objects are those of their properties their microcon-

stituents either completely lack or possess only contingently.

It is argued that this view comes closest to

meeting the standards

which inform the dissertation's

search.

Chapter VII summarizes the preceding chapters and
points out some items of philosophical interest concerning
the view endorsed in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER

I

Although Locke was not the first philosopher to
posit a difference among sorts of qualities, it is his
name that we most closely associate with the distinction

between primary and secondary qualities of physical objects.

In discussions of John Locke's Essay Concerning

Human Understanding

,

it is often implied that Locke ex-

pressed one coherent and consistent view of the primarysecondary quality distinction.

In this chapter

I

intend

to show that in fact Locke offers at least six different

suggestions as to how the primary-secondary quality dis-

tinction should be drawn.

After a brief discussion of

the history of the problem,

each suggestion.

I

shall present a sketch of

In each case,

I

make some tentative

criticisms
Locke lists size, figure, solidity, extension, motion
or rest, bulk and number as primary qualities.

Among

the secondary qualities are color, sound, taste, odor, heat
and coldness, and perhaps, smoothness and roughness.

That Locke confuses several distinct positions on the

difference between these two groups of qualities is not
surprising inasmuch as those philosophers who tackled
the problem before Locke express views on the issue which

superficially sound alike but are in fact diverse.
1

2

Traditionally, Democritus is credited with originating the primary-secondary quality distinction.
a

few fragments are devoted to this topic.

Only

In his

most frequently quoted fragment, Democritus says that
"by convention color exists, by convention bitter, by

convention sweet, but in reality atoms and void."l

One

view, then, that we can tentatively attribute to

Democritus is that at least some qualities exist only
"by convention."

Presumably, this means that although

the common person believes that certain qualities

like color, bitterness and sweetness exist, these

qualities in fact have no independent existence.
Other fragments express the view that sensible
color, odor and taste are caused by the arrangements
of the atoms which compose a physical object:

Color does not exist by nature. For
the elements have no qualities, neither
the solids nor the void. What is composed of these, however, is colored by
arrangement, proportion, and impulsion,
that is, order, shape, and position,
2
for appearances arise from these.
This quotation from Democritus implies that although

macroscopic things have color, etc., the atoms which
compose them have no color and presumably, no taste or
smell either.

Democritus also suggests here that the

color of a thing qualities its appearance rather than
the thing itself, so that macroscopic entities only

3

appear to be colored while, like the atoms and the void,
they in fact have no color.
In addition, Democritus postulates correlations be-

tween sensible qualities and the arrangements of atoms.

Theophrastus reports that Democritus assigns

a shape to

each quality, making "sweet to consist of fairly large,

spherical atoms.

To the quality sour he assigned very

large, rough shapes," and so on.

3

a problem arises here.

If each sensible quality is correlated with a shape,

we should not expect that color, taste and olfactory per-

ceptions could change solely because of

condition of the percipient.
that such phenomena do occur.

a

change in the

Yet Democritus recognizes

Theophrastus protests

against this inconsistency in Democritus.

He says.

But the one glaring inconsistency
running through the whole account is,
that he no sooner declares savors to
be subjective effects in sense than
he distinguishes them by their figures;
and he points out that the same substance appears bitter to some persons
and sweet to others and has still a
third quality for some other group.
For the figure cannot possibly be a
subjective effect, nor can one and
the same figure be spherical for certain
persons and of another shape for
^
others.
.

.

If Democritus holds that,

for example, whatever appears

sweet is made entirely of fairly large spherical atoms,
and that whatever appears sour is made entirely of very

large rough atoms, then he must also hold that if a

.

4

given substance can taste sweet to one person and sour
to another,

then that substance is both composed entire-

ly of fairly large spherical atoms and composed entirely of very large rough atoms.

This is manifestly im-

possible, and such a position is indeed inconsistent.
But it is not clear that this is Democritus' position.
First, he may not mean that whatever is sweet, sour,
etc., is composed entirely of atoms of a particular

shape.

Second, he may have wanted to make some sort

of distinction between real and apparent secondary

qualities, so that only things which are really sweet
or sour are composed of the appropriate sorts of atoms.
In that case it is possible that a collection of fairly

large spherical atoms might, under certain circumstances,

produce in tasters

a

non-sweet sensation.

A third

view, then, that we can attribute to Democritus is that

there is some sort of correlation between the micro-

scopic qualities of entities and their macroscopic

qualities.

It is difficult to say exactly what

Democritus' theory is, so we can attribute to him only a

sketch of a primary-secondary quality distinction.
In modern times we find philosopher-scientists

making similarly elusive comments about quality differences

For example, Kepler says.

Only those features of the world in

5

terms of which we get certain and
consistent knowledge open before us
what is indubitably and permanently
real.
Other qualities are not real
qualities of things, but only signs
of them.
The real world is a
world of quantitative characteristics only:
its differences are differences of number alone.
5
.

.

Here we have a more sophisticated expression of what

Democritus seemed to be saying.

In the world there

are only certain sorts of qualities

ones that can be measured.

— apparently,

only

Therefore, some of the

perceptions we have are not representations of real
qualities, but are mere signs that there exist certain

qualities.

Like Democritus, Kepler seems to think

that the so-called secondary qualities are mere appear-

ances and that these appearances are caused, in part,
by the real, quantitative qualities of physical objects.

Galileo proposed at least two means of distin-

guishing primary from secondary qualities.

Like his

predecessors, he characterizes primary qualities as
objective, actually inhering in physical objects, while

secondary qualities are subjective, mind-dependent
entities, perception of which is caused by the primary

qualities of things.

Galileo also suggests that primary

qualities are essential to bodies while secondary qualities are inessential to them.

(This is not surprising

if there are no secondary qualities in bodies.)

.

6

Galileo says,

Nevertheless I say, that indeed I feel
myself impelled by the necessity, as soon
as I conceive a piece of matter or corporeal substance, of conceiving that in
its own nature, it is bounded and figured
in such and such a figure, that in relation
to others it is large or small, that it
is in this or that place, in this or that
time, that it is in motion or remains at
rest, that it touches or does not touch
another body, that it is single, few or
many, in short, by no imagination can a
body be separated from such conditions:
but that it must be white or red, bitter
or sweet, sounding or mute, or a pleasant
or unpleasant odour, I do not perceive
my mind forced to acknowledge it neces^
sarily accompanied by such conditions.
We find the most carefully developed version of
the distinction in Boyle, who is credited with having

coined the expression "primary and secondary qualities"
Boyle takes secondary qualities to be dependent on

primary qualities, and he says that there is in physical

objects "nothing of real and physical but the size,
shape, and motion or rest of its component particles,

together with the texture of the whole, that results
from their being so contrived as they are."^

So far

Boyle sounds like all the others, but, unlike Democritus
et al. he does not characterize secondary qualities as

mind— dependent

.

He claims they are dispositions of

objects to effect changes and produce senations in

other entities.

As such, they would exist even if there

were no sentient creatures.

They (the sensible qualities) have an
absolute being irrelative to us; for
snow, for instance, would be white and
a glowing coal would be hot, though
there were no man or any other animal
in the world ... as the coal will
not only heat or burn a man's hand if
he touch it, but would likewise heat
wax ...
8
He says further that
if there were no animals there would
be no such thing as pain, yet a pin
may, upon account of its figure, be
fitted to cause pain in case it were

moved against

a

man's finger

...

9

Boyle makes quite a contribution here, in pointing
out something about the nature of a disposition that

Locke later forgets.
a

According to Boyle, to say that

glowing coal is hot is to say that it has the power

to burn a man's hand,

to melt wax,

and to produce sen-

sations of warmth in men's minds, etc.

Such a power

can be possessed by a piece of coal even were there
no hands,

no wax and no minds, although, without hands,

wax and minds, the power cannot be exercised.

Thus,

if secondary qualities are dispositions of objects,

they are not mind-dependent in the way Boyle's pre-

decessors took them to be.

Unfortunately, Boyle also

suggests that the secondary qualities are not "real
and physical."

It is not clear what Boyle means by

this, but the comment indicates that Boyle vacillates
in either his view of what a secondary quality is or hi

view of what a disposition is.

—
8

The outline above shows that Locke was
confronted

with a variety of positions: that primary qualities
actually inhere in bodies while secondary qualities
are mere appearances, not inhering in bodies themselves;

secondary qualities are mind— dependent entities

while primary qualities are not; that secondary qualities
are dependent on primary qualities; that primary quaare essential to bodies and secondary qualities

non-essential; that secondary qualities are dispositional

while primary qualities are not.

Locke freely adopts

all of these views and adds some of his own.

Our task

now is to examine Locke's presentation of these positions

.

To carry out this project it is necessary to try
to understand Locke's use of four terms:

'perception',

'idea',

'sensation', and 'quality'.

that 'idea' is "that term which

.

.

.

Locke says

serves best to

stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding

when a man thinks."

He says he uses it to express

"whatever is meant by phantasm

,

notion

,

species

,

or

whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in
thinking

.

"

To perceive, according to Locke, is the

same as to have an idea:

"To ask at what time a man

has first any ideas, is to ask, when he begins to per-

ceive

having ideas

,

and perception being the same

.

9

thing.

We can say tentatively that Locke uses 'idea'

and 'perception' synonymously.

While 'idea' and 'perception' denote mental phenomena,

'sensation' as Locke usually uses it denotes a

physical event.

A sensation is that activity of the

sense organs or brain which produces perceptions or
ideas.

"

It is

such an impression or motion made in some

part of the body as produces some perception in the

understanding

.

Sensations can be cotemporaneous

"

with ideas.
Locke defines 'quality' as the power to produce
an idea or perception in a mind.

are distinct.

Qualities and ideas

"Thus a snowball having the power to

produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round

— the

power to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the
snowball,

I

call qualities: and as they are sensations

or perceptions in our understandings,

ideas.

I

call them

It has been noted frequently that Locke

sometimes uses 'idea' when he should use 'quality',
but there is a further confusion in the Essay

.

At one

point Locke says.
To discover the nature of our ideas
the better, and to discourse of them
intelligently, it will be convenient
they are ideas
to distinguish them
and as
minds
our
or perceptions in
in
matter
of
they are modificatio ns
perceptions
the bodies that cause such
^^
in us

^

;

10

Locke, then, not only sometimes uses
'idea' and 'quality'
synonymously, but he also sometimes uses 'idea'
synony-

mously with 'modification of matter'.

it might be

thought that qualities just are modifications
of matter,
but we should be hesitant to attribute this view
to
Locke.

He says many things to indicate that the two

expressions have different meanings.
In the discussion that follows,

'idea'

and

'perception' will be used to refer only to objects of

thought or awareness, and unless otherwise indicated,

restricted in meaning to whatever is usually

meant by 'sense datum'.
Locke uses it.
meaning.

'Sensation' will be used as

'Quality' will be used without a fixed

Although Locke defines qualities as powers

to produce ideas in minds, he often speaks as if they

are something more or other than that.-

Accordingly, our

usage of the word 'quality' here will vary with Locke's
usage of it.
Locke begins his discussion of primary and secondary qualities by saying.

Qualities thus considered in bodies
are. First
such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what
state soever it be and such as in all
the alterations and changes it suffers,
all the force can be used upon it,
it constantly keeps; and such as sense
constantly finds in every
,

.

11

particle of matter which has bulk
enough to be perceived; and the
mind finds inseparable from every
particle of matter, though less than
to make itself singly be perceived
by our senses: v.g. take a grain of
wheat, divide it into two parts;
each part has still solidity, extension, figure, or mobility
For division can never take away
either solidity, extension, figure,
or mobility from any body
These
I call original or primary qualities
of body, which I think we may observe
to produce simple ideas in us, viz.
solidity, extension, figure, motion
or rest, and number.
Secondly such qualities which
in truth are nothing in the objects
themselves but powers to produce
various sensations in us by their
primary qualities, i.e., by the bulk
figure, texture, and motions of their
insensible parts, as colours, sounds,
tastes, etc.
These I call secondary
qualities
.

.

.

.

.

.

,

Essential and Inessential Qualities
Locke indicates early, then, that primary qualities
are essential to bodies; nothing that is a body could

lack any of the determinable primary qualities.

No matter

what changes are made in a physical object, it retains
the properties of having some size or other, some shape or

other, some degree of bulk, capability of motion, etc.

Although Locke does not say so, we can assume that
secondary qualities are not essential to bodies; something can be a body and yet lack the power to produce

sensations of taste, color, odor, sound, etc.

We can

,

12

express the essential-inessential criterion this way:
(LI)

Determinable quality Q is primary iff
a body 3 a x has Q)

(x) (x

Determinable quality Q is secondary iff
is a
(LI)

is,

bodyoO

x lacks

is

(x) (x

Q)

at first glance, a curious position for Locke

to hold.

Locke names size, figure, solidity, extension,

motion or rest, bulk, and number as the primary qualities.
(LI),

however, yields that an infinite number of qualities

other than these are primary.

Being self-identical

being red or not red, being six feet long or not six
feet long, being self-identical or red
are primary according to (LI)

.

— all

of these

So we must conclude

that even if all the primary qualities are qualities

which all bodies have necessarily, they must have some
other feature which distinguishes them from all the
other qualities that bodies have necessarily.
Furthermore, Locke says later in the Essay that
we do not know the real essences of things.
ably,

Presum-

though, we are well acquainted with primary

qualities.

How, then, can primary qualities be essen-

tial to bodies?

Perhaps Locke does not mean that

primary qualities are essential to bodies; instead,
he may mean to say something about the discoverability
of various qualities in bodies.

A careful investiga-

tion of an ice cube, for example, would reveal it to

13

have shape, size, solidity, etc. and to lack taste and
smell.
a

From this fact, one can derive an attempt at

primary-secondary quality distinction, and

I

shall

discuss it in more detail later.

Secondary Qualities as Powers

Another way of formulating a primary-secondary
quality distinction is suggested by the passage quoted
above: Locke says that secondary qualities are powers
of bodies to produce sensations and ideas.

Perhaps,

then, primary qualities are not powers, but something

else instead.

Like the view that the primary qualities

are the essential properties of bodies, the position

that primary qualities are not powers is not readily

attributable to Locke.
to produce ideas.

He defines qualities as powers

Since primary qualities are quality

paradigms, we should expect that they, like the secondary qualities, are powers.

Perhaps Locke means that

secondary qualities are merely powers while primary

qualities are powers plus something else.

We have

already seen that Locke does not explicitly equate

qualities with modifications of matter.

Perhaps primary

qualities are both powers to produce ideas and modifications of matter.

This sounds something like the view

held by several contemporary philosophers that secondary

)

.

)

14

ax© dispositional qualities while primary

qualities are non-dispositional

position later.

.

I

shall take up this

At present it should suffice to say

that Locke has no well developed view here.

Secondary Qualities as Dependent on Primary Qualities
Later in chapter viii, Locke hints at another

primary-secondary quality distinction.

In paragraph

13 he says that
a violet,

by the impulse of such
insensible particles of matter, of
peculiar figures and bulks, and in
different degrees and modifications
of their motion, causes the ideas of
the blue colour, and sweet scent of
that flower to be produced in our
minds
Here, as in his opening passage, Locke is proposing

that secondary qualities are in some way dependent
on primary qualities.

If we take the secondary qua-

lities to be powers to produce in us ideas of color,
smell, taste, sound and the like, then the passage

above suggests that if an object lacked primary qualities,
it would also lack such powers.

Roughly, then, the

distinction would be this:
(L2)

Quality Q is primary iff 0 (Ex) (x has Q and<^(EQ')
(Q
is distinct from Q and x has Q'
and Q depends on Q
'

'

)

Quality Q is secondary iff Q (x) (x has Q3(EQ’)(Q'
is distinct from Q and x has Q' and Q
depends on Q
'

)

.

)

)

15

The notion of dependency here is too vague to be of

much use to Locke.
of dependency,

Given an intuitive understanding

it seems as though some primary qualities

are dependent on others, e.g., size is dependent on shape

and vice versa.

(L2)

then rules that size and shape

are secondary qualities, a result we want to avoid.

Clearly, what we need is something like:
(L2')

Quality Q is primary iff

0 (Ex) (x has Q and
/^(EF) (F is a secondary quality and
X has F)

Quality Q is secondary iff O (x) (x has QD (EF)
(F is a primary quality distinct
from Q and x has F)
(L2')

may express a truth, but it will never do as the

makings of a defintion because it is circular.

To use

it, we need to know beforehand which qualities are

primary and which are secondary.

We cannot find out

which qualities are primary without knowing which are
secondary and vice versa.
More sophisticated expressions of this version of
a

primary-secondary quality distinction will be taken

up in Chapter VI

The Resemblance Thesis

At II,viii,15 Locke takes a different approach
to the distinction.

He began

of qualities in bodies.

by distinguishing sorts

Here he distinguishes among

16

ideas of qualities.

He says,

The ideas of primary qualities of
bodies are resemblances of them, and
their patterns do really exist in the
bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary
qualities have no resemblance of them
at all.
There is nothing like our
ideas existing in the bodies themselves.
They are, in the bodies
we denominate from them, only a power
to produce those sensations in us
.

.

.

This Lockean doctrine, that primary quality ideas are

patterned after something in objects while secondary
quality ideas are not, is sometimes known as the

Resemblance Thesis.

Many of Berkeley's arguments

against Locke are directed toward the thesis.

Although

Locke offers it as a means of distinguishing among
ideas, it can be formulated to express a distinction

among qualities.
(L3)

Quality Q is primary iff the ideas produced in
sentient creatures by Q resemble Q.

Quality Q is secondary iff the ideas produced
in sentient creatures by Q do not
resemble Q.
The notion that a resemblance relation can obtain

between an idea and one of its causes is a tangled one.
First of all, Locke does not tell us how much or in

what way an idea must be like an object if it is to be
said to resemble that object and this omission raises

serious questions, e.g., can the idea or sensum pro-

17

duced in us when we look at a sphere be said to resemble
a sphere?
ii^otion

Worse

— can

the idea we get when we observe

resemble motion?

to answer such questions.

One does not know how to begin
Second, it is not clear

that there is any sense in which an idea can be said
to resemble a quality or an object.

Third, it seems

we could never know which of our ideas resemble the

external world and which don't, since by hypothesis
here, we never directly observe the external world.

The depth of these difficulties can be indicated by re-

turning to the text.
At II,viii,

15-18, Locke offers three arguments,

ostensibly in support of the Resemblance Thesis.

They

are about the heat of a flame, the whiteness and coldness of snow and the whiteness and sweetness of manna.

Since the arguments are similar in form,
fine my attention to the flame argument.

I

shall con-

Locke says,

Flame is denominated hot and light
he that will consider that the
same fire that, at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth,
does, at a nearer approach, produce
in us the far different sensation of
pain, ought to bethink himself what
reason he has to say that this idea
of warmth, which was produced in him
by the fire, is actually in the fire
and his idea of pain, which the
same fire produced in him the same
way, is not in the fire.
.

.

.

—

On a

,

straightforward reading of the passage above,

18

the conclusion argued for is that the idea of warmth

that a person has when he is near a fire is not in the
fire, but surely Locke is not arguing for that non-

controversial position.

Rather he is trying to argue

for the apparently different view that there is no

warmth in the fire.

Here is a plausible rendering of

the argument:
(1)

At distance d, fire produces in us an idea of
warmth.

(2)

At distance d', fire produces in us an idea
of pain.

(3)

If there is no pain in the fire, then there
is no warmth in the fire.

(4)

There is no pain in the fire.

(5)

There is no wannth in the fire.

The inference from

explanation.

and

(1)

(2)

to

(3)

requires some

Locke does not offer one, but perhaps

what he has in mind is this:

if we walk slowly toward

a fire and attend to our ideas, we will notice that

at first we feel warmth, later we feel warmth and some

pain, and finally we feel no warmth, only pain.

What we experience is

a

series of ideas that seem in-

timately related to one another, so intimately related
that it is tempting to say that there is only one

sensation in our bodies,

a

sensation that is mild at

one time and intense at another.

I

do not wish to

19

comment on the plausibility of this view because it is
not crucial to our purpose here.

how we read premise

(4)

What is crucial is

and hence, the conclusion.

The most natural interpretation of
fire feels no pain.

take

(5)

If we read

(4)

(4)

is that the

this way, we should

to mean that the fire feels no warmth.

We

must suppose that Locke thinks that such a commonplace
needs no argument.

Ordinary usage suggests another reading.

We

sometimes say that wounds and the like are not painful.

What we mean is that they cause us no pain.

Premise (2),

however, tells us that fire does cause pain, so this

reading must be rejected also.
left with this:

It looks as if we are

in the fire there is nothing like the

pain that we feel.

If this is supposed to mean some-

thing other than that the fire does not feel pain,
it is hard to say what it is.

Perhaps Locke is using

the notion that pain is essentially mental and there-

fore does not inhere in physical objects, but from this
it does not follow by the reasoning above that warmth
is essentially mental.

In fact, it is tempting to

be perverse and say here that pain and warmth are per-

ceptions, mental entities, while their cause is not.

The cause of each is the warmth of the fire, thus there
is no warmth in the fire.

.
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The manna argument is even more troublesome, for

there Locke wants to compare sweetness and whiteness

with "acute pains or gripings."

One begins to wonder

if the Resemblance Thesis has any cognitive content.

Certainly Locke is not at all helpful here.

He gives

us no idea of what it means to say that there is some-

thing like pain or a feeling of warmth in a physical
object.

Several contemporary philosophers have revived

the Resemblance Thesis and
a

I

shall consider them in

later chapter.
The Berkeley-Reid Interpretation
It should be noted that the fire, snow and manna

arguments are solid evidence that Locke takes secondary

qualities to be ideas.

There is a further argument

that supports this interpretation of Locke.

At II,viii,

20 we find the "almond argument".

Pound an almond, and the clear white
colour will be altered into a dirty
one, and the sweet taste into an
oily one. What real alteration can
the beating of the pestle make in
any body, but an alteration of the
texture of it?
We can formulate

Locke's argument as follows:

(1)

When an almond is pounded its taste and color
change

(2)

When an almond is pounded, nothing in the almond
changes except its texture.
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(3)

Neither the taste nor the color of an almond
is identical with its texture.

(4)

The taste and the color of an almond are not
qualities of the almond.

As Bennett^^ points out, the argument begs the question.

Support for premise
the conclusion.

portant here.

(2)

would pre-suppose the truth of

Locke's question-begging is not imThe noteworthy thing is that Locke seems

to suppose that color and taste are ideas or perceptions,

subjective, mind-dependent entities.

Both Berkeley and Reid, in attacking Locke's

primary-secondary quality distinction, attribute to
Locke the view that the difference between primary and
secondary qualities is ontological, that primary qualities

actually inhere in objects
cal," in Boyle's words

— they

— while

are "real and physi-

secondary qualities,

being in some way mind-dependent entities, do not

actually inhere in physical objects.

At least two

interpretations of this position are possible:

(1)

primary qualities are qualities while secondary qualities are not qualities at all but rather transient,

mind-dependent entities; and

(2)

both primary and

secondary qualities are qualities, but while primary

qualities have physical objects as instances, secondary qualities can and/or do have as instances only
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ideas or sensa.

Further elaboration of these two

interpretations is presented in a later chapter.

Alteration of Qualities
A final version of the primary-secondary quality

distinction is suggested by Locke's porphyry argument
(

II viii 19
,

,

)

.

We can formulate the porphyry argument

this way:
(1)

When the light is shut off, the color of the
porphyry vanishes.

(2)

V7hen the light is shut off,

no alteration is

made in the porphyry.
(3)

when the light is shut off, the color of
the porphyry vanishes and no alteration is
made in the porphyry, then what vanishes is
not in the porphyry.

(4)

What vanishes is not in the porphyry.

(5)

What vanishes is the color of the porphyry.

(6)

The color of the porphyry is not a quality of
the porphyry.

If,

Again, this argument can be taken as support for the

Berkeley-Reid interpretation of Locke, but another
interpretation is possible.

The argument suggests

that an object's secondary qualities can be changed

without making any physical change in the object itself, while primary qualities of an object can be

changed only by making some physical alteration in
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the object.

(L4)

is an attempt to formulate what is

hinted at here.
(L4)

Quality Q is primary iff
(x) (x is a body and
X loses Q at time t o x undergoes a
physical alteration at t)
Quality Q is secondary iff O (Ex) (x is a body and
X loses Q at time t and x does not
undergo a physical alteration at t)

Note that

(L4)

can distinguish among only determinate

qualities, since it is doubtful that objects can lose

their determinable primary qualities.

(L4)

raises

problems in that we must determine what counts as a

physical alteration and we must do it in a non-questionbegging way.

Furthermore we must determine when it is

proper to say that an object undergoes

a

quality change.

If we say that an object’s qualities change every time

they appear to change--a principle at work in the por-

phyry argument--we must explain why we want to say
that objects sometimes retain their determinate primary

qualities when those qualities appear to change.

If

we attempt a distinction between real and apparent

qualities, we will,

I

believe, be at a loss to find a

case where an object's real secondary qualities change

without an accompanying physical alteration.

I

believe

that (L4) alone cannot serve to distinguish primary from

secondary qualities, since we cannot evaluate it with-
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out having at least a sketch of a theory about the

nature of secondary qualities.
Tertiary Qualities

Before

I

conclude,

tertiary qualities.

I

should say a word about

Locke says very little about them.

They are "barely powers," he tells us.

porary philosophers ignore them.

Most contem-

Those who do discuss

them classify them with either the primary or the

secondary qualities, depending on the analysis they
offer.

I,

too,

see little reason for a third category

of qualities and will discuss the tertiaries only when

consideration of them might be enlightening.

For the

most part, it will be clear from the primary-secondary

quality distinction under scrutiny which of the tertiaries belong in which group of qualities.

.

.
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CHAPTER

II

Where Locke first offers an account of primary
qualities, he suggests that primary qualities are in
some sense essential to bodies.

Locke does not use the

terms

He says,

'essence' or 'essential'.

Qualities thus considered in
bodies are.
First, such as are utterly
inseparable from the body, in
what estate soever it be; and
such as in all the alterations
and changes it suffers, all
the force can be used upon it,
it constantly keeps.

1

This passage suggests that primary qualities are essential to bodies in a standard sense of 'essential', namely,

that bodies possess primary qualities necessarily; that
is,

anything that is a body has all of the primary

qualities in every possible world.

2

If being essential

or necessary to bodies is taken as a distinctive char-

acteristic of primary qualities, we can infer that for
Locke, secondary qualities are inessential to bodies,

possessed by them only contingently.
Just below the quoted passage, Locke points to
He says

another characteristic of primary qualities.
that primary qualities are
such as sense finds constantly
in every particle of matter which
has bulk enough to be perceived.
26

^

.
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This passage seems to say that every, time a body is

perceived, it is perceived to have primary qualities.
In other words, for any body and any perceiver of that

body, the body produces in the perceiver an idea of

some primary quality.

Locke's phrasing here suggests

that the percipient receives ideas of all of the primary

qualities, so that we should strengthen the claim to:
for any body and any perceiver of that body, the body

produces in the perceiver ideas of each of the primary

qualities
We cannot attribute such a view to Locke, however.
He holds that we receive the idea of solidity solely

from the sense of touch.

perceiving

a

Since not all instances of

body are instances of touching that body,

it is patently false that bodies always produce an idea
of solidity in their perceivers.

mean is that if one investigates

What Locke might
a

body under optimal

conditions, that is, employs all five senses when

observation conditions are at their best, then one will
receive ideas of all the primary qualities.

Again we

must assume that this feature is one Locke thinks
peculiar to primary qualities and that he believes that
even under optimal conditions, one or more of the secondary qualities may fail to be perceived by the observer.

After the latter quoted comment, Locke says that
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primary qualities are those which
the mind finds inseparable from
every particle of matter, though
less than to make itself singly
^
be perceived by our senses.

Although Locke does not use the word 'conceive' here,
it is natural to interpret this passage as dealing with

our conception of material objects.

Locke has already

noted how we are sensually affected by material objects;
now he turns to our thinking about them.

In this pas-

sage Locke seems to be saying that one cannot conceive
of a body as lacking any of the primary qualities.

Locke may be relying here on the philosophical rule of
thumb that whatever is inconceivable is impossible
to infer that it is impossible that a body should lack

any of the primary qualities.
The claim Locke makes here is ambiguous between
a

claim about conception in the sense of mental picturing

and a claim about non-pictorial conception.

When

Berkeley deals with this claim, he relies on the former
reading.^

It is on the latter interpretation that the

assertion seems to imply that primary qualities are
essential to bodies.

The implication that one can con-

ceive of a body as lacking any or all of the secondary

qualities is ambiguous in the same way as the claim about
the primaries.

The similarities among the three claims Locke makes
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warrants their being examined together.

Accordingly,

shall deal with each of them in this chapter.

I

shall

l

attempt to clarify them and then show that none of the
constitutes a successful distinction between

^h.ree

and secondary gualities.

P^^iniary

Since the second is

the most easily disposed of and consequently the least

intriguing,

I

shall deal with it first.

Then

shall

I

consider the third claim and finally, the first, which
is the most philosophically persuasive.
I

In each case,

restrict my attention to macroscopic physical objects

and ignore their microscopic parts, molecules, atoms

and so on.

A discussion of the properties of these

microentities can be found in Chapter VI.
Optimal Perception of Physical Objects
To facilitate expression of the claim that percep-

tion of a body under good conditions always results
in the perception of all the primary qualities,

duce the term

'

0-perceives

'

,

intro-

I

which will be used to

capture the notion of perception with all available
senses under favoravle or optimal conditions.

I

stipu-

late that a person, S, 0-perceives a physical object, x,
in a world, w, only if
w,

(2)

S

(1)

S

is a normal percipient in

employs all his sense apparatus, and

vation conditions are favorable to

a

(3)

obser-

degree that is
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average or better than average in w.

We 0-perceive

objects in this world only if we employ all five working
senses under standard or better observation conditions;
that is, there is light, a medium for the transporting
of sound waves, etc.

Now we can express the view that 0-perception of

objects in this world always results in the production
of ideas of all the primary qualities as:
is a primary quality and P 0-perceives
X produces in P an idea of Q)

(P) (x) (Q) (Q

X

3

where

'x'

ranges over material objects and

over perceivers.

'P'

ranges

This claim has at least initial

plausibility with regard to the so-called "fully
determinable" primaries, the qualities that appear on
the Lockean lists--size, shape and so forth.

It has no

plausibility with regard to other qualities Locke would
wish to call primary, namely, determinates of the fully
determinable primaries

— the

properties of being six

feet tall, square and so forth.

Locke has been often

and justly criticized for ignoring the determinable-

determinate quality distinction, but his oversight is,
at least in principle, remediable.

The obvious solution

is to try to define primary qualities as those qualities

which either have some feature,

F,

forms of some quality which has F.

or are determinate

Now we can consider:

.

.

s

.
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(El) (A)

Quality Q is primary iff either (i) Q(P) (x)
(P 0-perceives xO x produces in P
an idea of Q)
or

(ii)

Q is a

determinate of some quality which
satisfies (A-i)
(B)

Quality Q is secondary iff (i) 0 (EP) (Ex) (P
0-perceives x and it is not the
case that x produces in P an idea
of Q)

and
satisfy (A-ii)

Before we can evaluate

(El)

(ii)

Q fails to

it is necessary to

add a word or two about the notion of determinable and

determinate qualities.

This classification of qualities

relative to one another was proposed by W.E. Johnson
in his Logic

7
,

and

I

strive here to use

the terms

'determinable' and 'determinate' as Johnson does with
the exception that

than to terms.

I

apply them to properties rather

The most enlightening thing that Johnson

says about the twofold classification is this:
I propose to call such terms as
colour and shape de terminable in
relation to such terms as red and
circular which will be called
determinates ... To predicate
colour or shape of an object obviously characterizes it less determinately than to predicate of
it red or circular hence the former adjectives may be said to be
indeterminate compared with the
latter
;

Johnson's characterization of determinate and determinable qualities is a bit sketchy, yet attempts to forma-
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lize the distinction have not been clearly
successful.^
I

do not attempt to make progress here where others

have failed.

I

trust that the distinction is suffi-

ciently well understood to be useful and that the

problems which infest it due to its vagueness will not

seriously affect our evaluation of either

(El)

or sub-

sequent proposals which employ the notions of deter-

minableness and determinateness.
'P

is a determinate of Q'

I

shall simply take

as primitive and say that a

quality, Q, is determinable only if there is some other

quality, P, such that P is a determinate of Q.

It

should be noted that a quality can be a determinable
in relation to its determinates and yet be a determinate
in relation to a further quality or qualities.

Now we are ready to comment on

(El)

.

Someone

might object that in requiring that the truth of (A-i)
be logically necessary,

claim.

I

violate the spirit of Locke's

Indeed, it seems that Locke might mean to make

a purely empirical claim when he says that primary

qualities are "such as sense constantly finds in every

particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived."
Perhaps we should formulate Locke's insight in terms
of physical necessity, and possibility.

Consider:

.

.

33

(i22) (A)

Quality Q is primary iff either (i)[Q (P) (x)
(P 0-perceives xo x produces in P
an idea of Q)
or

(ii)

Q is a

determinate of some quality which
satisfies (A-i)
(B)

Quality Q is secondary iff (i)^(EP) (Ex) (P
0-perceives x and it is not the
case that x produces in P an idea
of Q)

and
satisfy (A-ii)

One problem with (E2)

(ii)

Q fails to

is that it yields the result

that color is a primary quality, for it is physically

necessary that any sighted 0-observer of a physical

object receive an idea of color.

The 0-perception of

any physical object results in the production of an

idea of some color or other.

Even perfectly trans-

parent objects appear to have darkly colored borders;
besides, the 0-observer of a transparent object sees
the colors of the objects behind it.

(E2)

also rele-

gates hardness and warmth (or cold) to the category
of the primaries, for every time a normal perceiver

touches a physical object, he receives an idea of some

degree or other of both hardness and warmth.
of these difficulties, it is clear that (E2)

In view

cannot

express the distinction Locke had in mind; neither does
it accord with any of the standard intuitions which have

prompted philosophers to try to draw a primary-secondary

,
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quality distinction.
We are forced to return to (El)

^hile it lacks the difficulties of
of its own.

Unlike (E2

(El)

)

,

only to find that

(E2)

,

it has some

does not legislate that

color, hardness and warmth are primary qualities.

Al-

though we do in fact always perceive these qualities
in the objects we 0-perceive, it is not logically

necessary that we do so.

In some possible world our

0-perceptions would fail to produce ideas of, say,
color.

For instance, we can imagine a world which lacks

light.

In that world, observation of objects even under

the optimum conditions of the world might fail to

produce color ideas in percipients.

But if we can

imagine worlds in which color perception does not occur,

we can imagine worlds in which perception of the Lockean
primary qualities does not occur.

In any world in

which sight is impossible due to lack of

light and

touch is impossible due to extreme repulsion between
atoms, all perception of the Lockean primary qualities

might fail.
narrow.

Where

(E2)

is too broad,

(El)

seems too

It looks as though (El) yields the result

that no quality is primary since no quality is perceived
in every possible world.

The failures of

(El)

and (E2)

suggest that perhaps
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Locke's comment is not meant to express a primary-secondary

quality distinction.

In a discussion of the passage

we are dealing with, Aaron claims that instead, it is

meant as an explanation of how we come to have certain
beliefs about primary qualities.

Explicating Locke,

Aaron says.

Whenever we experience a physical
object ideas of the primary qualities
are part of the whole complex idea
which we then have. Here is our
first suggestion of the constant presence of these qualities in things.

H

Aaron takes Locke to be offering an account of how
we come to believe that all physical objects always

possess all of the primary qualities.

However, if

Locke is appealing to certain facts about perceptual
episodes to either imply or justify the quality distinction he draws, then he errs seriously.

We have al-

ready seen that one does not always perceive all of
the primary qualities when one observes an object, and
the deficiencies in (El)

and

(E2)

show that an intro-

duction of the notion of an optimal kind of observation
solves that problem but creates others.

The perceptual

evidence Aaron cites does not justify the Lockean classi-

fication of qualities.

.

.

.

)
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Conception of Physical Objects
We turn to the view that it is inconceivable that
a

physical object should lack any of the primary qualities

^hile it is conceivable that an object lack any or all
of the secondary qualities.
(E3) (A)

We can express this view as:

Quality Q is primary iff either (i) jp(x) (y) (x
is a body 3 (y conceives of x 3 y conceives that X has Q)
or

(ii)

Q is a

determinate of some quality which
satisfies (A-i)
(B)

Quality Q is secondary iff (i)^(Ex) (Ey) (x is
a body and y conceives of x and y
conceives that x lacks Q)
and
satisfy (A-ii)

(E3j

(ii)

Q fails to

appears to yield results more in accord with

Locke's lists of primary and secondary qualities than
do

(El)

and (E2)

For instance, no one can conceive

of a body as lacking extension or shape or size or

number or solidity or capability of motion, but it
seems that one can conceive of a body as lacking odor
or taste or sound.

If

is a secondary quality,

(E3)

it must be that one can conceive

of a body as lacking color.
to this assertion.

is to legislate that color

Berkeley, however, objects

He says.

For my own part, I see evidently that
it is not in my power to frame an idea
of a body extended and moving but I
must withal give it some colour or
,
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other sensible quality, which is
acknowledged to exist in the mind

.

.

.

is arguing that it is impossible to conceive

of a body as having the primary qualities while lacking
of the secondary qualities.

He does not say that

an object must be conceived as having every secondary

quality, only that it must be conceived as having at

least one.

Unfortunately, Berkeley does not support

his contention; he seems to think that everyone, upon

reflection, would find himself similarly unable to

conceive of a body as lacking all of the secondary
qualities.

The most reasonable interpretation of

Berkeley's remark is that what he has in mind is conceiving a body by mentally picturing it.

If we re-

phrase Berkeley's claim to "No one can form a mental

representation of a body that lacks every secondary
quality," its truth becomes obvious.

Suppose

I

form a

mental picture of a tree.

In addition to picturing it

as extended,

I

shaped, etc.,

shall also picture it as

But

having some color or other.
as having color;

tree in the dark.

I

I

need not picture it

might imagine, instead, touching
If

I

do this,

I

a

must imagine the tree

as having some degree of roughness and some degree of

hardness.

The point is that no matter how

mental picture of the tree,

I

I

form my

must picture it as having

.
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some secondary quality or other.

Berkeley’s view, however, does nothing to show that
(E3)

is inconsistent with the Lockean quality distinction.

Even if we read 'conceive' as Berkeley does, Berkeley's
claim about mental representation is consistent with

(E3)

From the premise that every conceived body must have
some secondary quality or other, it does not follow that

there is any particular secondary quality that a con-

ceived body must have.

On (E3)

,

for a quality to be

primary, it must be that no conceived body could lack
it or some determinable of it, but Berkeley's claim

does not attribute that characteristic to any of the

secondary qualities.
However, Berkeley's comments do suggest a way in
which, if we read 'conceive' in the Berkeleyan manner,

we can suggest, that

(E3)

excludes from primacy at least

one of the qualities traditionally considered primary.

We said earlier that one might conceive a body as lacking
color by picturing touching the body in the dark.

Or,

as was hinted, one could imagine a body as lacking

hardness by forming a mental impression of it that omits
tactual impressions.

If we can exclude these secondary

qualities from our mental representations of bodies,
then perhaps we can exclude solidity from them as well
by forming a visual impression of the object and exclu-

.

39

ding from it the idea of solidity.
Locke, resistance to

Solidity is, for

penetration; we receive the idea

of this quality from the sense of touch.
a

If we form

mental picture of an object and omit from that pic-

ture all tactual impressions, then we neglect to include
in our representation an idea of solidity.

possible,

(E3)

If this is

relegates solidity to the secondary

qualities
This argument, however, is not sufficient to show

that (E3) is defective, because the sense in which
'conceive' is used in (E3)

need not be the sense of

'conceive' in which it means mentally picture or repre-

Locke probably has in mind a non-pictorial sense

sent.

of

'conceive' in which it is more properly applicable

to propositions and means the same as

'entertain'.

So it remains to evaluate

this other reading of 'conceive'.

matter.

'consider' or
(E3)

under

This is a different

The claim that such and such a state of affairs

is inconceivable is often taken as equivalent to the

claim that that state of affairs is logically impossible.
Then the claim that it is inconceivable that a body
lack quality Q is equivalent to the claim that it is

impossible that

a

body lack Q.

One problem with assertions about what is or is not

conceivable is that they are difficult to falsify.

If

I

.
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say that

I

cannot conceive that a body lack some alleged

secondary quality, say color, it will be difficult for
a

proponent of

(E3)

to prove that

best the proponent of

(E3)

I

am

mistaken.

The

can do in this situation is

to appeal to some other theory on which color is inessen-

tial to bodies and by this tactic try to show that

I

must be able to conceive that a body lack color since
bodies possess color only contingently.

Accordingly,

we turn to the first of Locke's views, that primary

qualities are possessed by bodies necessarily while
secondary quality possession is a contingent matter.
Our verdict on this view will dictate our final evaluation of

(E3)

Essential Qualities of Physical Objects
One apparent problem with attributing to Locke the

view that primary qualities are essential to bodies
is that he denies that we can know the real essences of

things.

If,

qualities of

then, we are acquainted with the primary
a body,

they cannot constitute its real

essence, which is unknown to us.

This alleged problem

is not a serious one for two reasons:

(1)

the view that

primary qualities are essential to bodies while secondary

qualities are not is philosophically interesting

whether Locke held it or not; and

(2)

if

'essential' is
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taken to mean necessary rather than belonging to the real
or nominal essence of, then Locke says little or nothing

which conflicts with the doctrine under consideration.
Locke says that the word ’essence' has "several significations

"
.

First, essence may be taken for the
being of anything, whereby it is what
it is.
And thus the real internal, but
generally (in substances) unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be
called their essence. This is the proper original signification
Secondly ... it being evident that
things are ranked under names into
sorts or species only as they agree to
certain abstract ideas, to which we
have annexed those names, the essence
of each genus or sort, comes to be
nothing but that abstract idea which
.name stands
the general, or sortal
.These two sorts of essences, I
for
suppose, may not unfitly be termed the
one the real the other nominal essence
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

.

,

It is clear from this passage that Locke cannot identify

the primary qualities of objects with their real essences,

for their real essences are, in some sense, the cause of

their discoverable properties rather than being identical

with any of them.
0027tainly

,

The primary qualities of objects are

on Locke's view, discoverable and therefore

cannot be considered part of Lockean real essences.

So,

the fact that Locke says that the real essences of things
to
are unknown to us does not preclude our attributing

.
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him the view that primary qualities are "essential,"
in the humble sense of "necessary," to bodies.

Nominal essences, according to Locke, are not hidden
from us.

For instance,

Locke calls the nominal essence

of gold "all those properties of colour, weight, fusi-

bility, fixedness, &c., which makes it to be gold, or

gives it a right to that name."^^

Since its color is

part of the nominal essence of gold, we cannot identify
nominal essences with any set of primary qualities, so
even Locke's remarks about nominal essences are irrelevant to the view we are about to consider.

The fore-

going makes it clear that Locke does not identify essences, nominal or real, with properties a thing has

necessarily, although surely all Lockean real and nominal

essences are possessed necessarily by the things that
have them

We are free now to take a closer look at the view
that what distinguishes primary from secondary qualities
is that the former are necessary to bodies while the

latter are not.

First, we introduce a notion of contin-

gency of qualities:

Quality Q is contingent

(Ex) (Qx)

and

(Ex)

(^Qx)

This notion of contingency is introduced in order to

eliminate from consideration all those qualities which

.

;

.

.
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;

wg wsnt to focus on thosG

qualitiGS which bodies have necessarily.

Now we can

consider
(E4) (A)

Quality Q is primary iff either
tingent and (x) (x has

Q is conhas Q)
(ii) Q is a
(i)

Q:i>

or

qx

determinate of a quality that satisfies
(B)

(A-i)

Quality Q is secondary iff (i) Q is contingent and (x) (x has Q^ Ox lacks Q)
and
satisfy (A-ii)

To see how

(E4)

(ii)

Q fails to

works we can consider two qualities,

being extended and having an odor.

(E4)

will rule that

being extended is primary; it is a contingent quality
and everything that is extended is so necessarily.

On

the other hand, having an odor appears to be a secondary

quality since it is possible that something that does
in fact have an odor

But (E4)

it.

—a

rose, for instance

is unsatisfactory.

— might

lack

Consider the property

of being identical with some proposition or other.

It

is a contingent property and all those things that have

it have it necessarily.

(E4),

then, yields the result

that the property of being identical with some propo-

sition or other, a property which all physical objects
lack,

is primary.

We need a more restrictive criterion.

Consider then:
(E5) (A)

Quality Q is primary iff either

(i)

Q is con-

,

.

.

,

;
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gent and

Qx

(x) (x

is a material objects

has Q)

or

Q is a

(ii)

determinate of a quality that
satisfies (A-i)
(B)

Quality Q is secondary iff (i) Q is contingent
and (x) (x is a material object and
X has QD <>x lacks Q)
and
satisfy (A-ii)

(E5

)

although an improvement on

tory either.

(E4)

Q fails to

(ii)

is not satisfac-

Consider the property of being a material

object; it satisfies

sidered primary if

(E5-A)

(E5)

and must therefore be con-

is accepted.

Consider also the

property of failing to be a proposition;
that it, too, is primary.

(E5)

legislates

The property of being com-

posed of atoms may be primary according to

simi-

(E5)

larly, Lockean real essences, the "unknown constitutions
of things," are primary.

These properties are not at

all the sorts of property that Locke has in mind when
he makes a primary-secondary quality distinction.

Some-

one might argue that this is merely a technical difficulty, one which could be overcome by the addition of

appropriate restrictive clauses.

Indeed, perhaps we

could lessen the number of counterexamples to

(E5)

making more and more refinements in it, but

suggest

I

that we could never add enough restrictions to
to free it from difficulties altogether.

by

(E5)

The problem
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with

(E5)

is not merely technical.

(E5)

is intended to

express the view that the primary qualities are those

contingent properties possessed necessarily by material
objects while the secondary qualities are those possessed
only contingently by material objects.

As long as we

retain this intuition, the criterion that expresses it
will include among the primaries many properties other
than the Lockean primaries.

It may be that all the

traditional primaries are necessary to all material
objects, but many other properties are so as well.

Being necessary to material objects is not a distinctive

feature of the traditional primary qualities.

It should

be noted also that a list of all those properties that

fail to belong to the essences of material objects would

differ radically from any traditional list of the
secondary qualities.
(E5)

suffers a more important defect.

It legis-

lates that at least three of the qualities traditionally

considered secondary are instead primary qualities;

(E5)

rules that color, hardness and temperature are primary

qualities, for no material object could lack any of these

properties.

This is relatively easy to show.

Suppose we do as many philosophers do and regard
these three qualities as dispositions to produce certain
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sensations in some sentient creature under specifiable

conditions

.

It seems clear that even a world which

lacks light and the possibility of contact between

objects can, if it has material objects, have colored
and hard and warm objects.

The objects in that world

would have the capacity to produce visual and tactual
and thermal sensations in sentient creatures were they

removed to a world more like ours.

If they have the

requisite dispositions, which they must, then they
have color and some degree of hardness and some degree
of heat.

It seems to be impossible for an object to

have all of the traditional primary qualities and yet
lack the dispositions

I

have mentioned, since, we think,

the possession of these primary qualities is sufficient
for

which

the possession of these dispositions.

lacks

An object

solidity might very well lack the dispo-

sition to produce colored visual sensations in us, but
if it is possible for an object to lack solidity then
(E5)

is deficient in characterizing solidity as a

secondary quality.

If,

instead of regarding color as

the disposition to produce color sensations in sentient

creatures, we regard it as the disposition to reflect
light, it becomes even more obvious that material ob-

jects are necessarily colored.
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instead of regarding the secondary qualities as

If,

dispositions, we regard them as non-dispositional

it

,

may seem that in a world without light things simply
lack color or that in a world without pressure- and

temperature-sensitive percipients things lack hardness
and heat.

We may ask, however, whether there is any

good reason to so tie the possession of secondary qualities to the actual behavior of objects.

We do not

require of an object that it actually behave in some

characteristic way before we attribute primary qualities
to it.

Consider

a

possible world in which there is

nothing material but a stationary one-foot cube.

We

would not hesitate to say that this cube is solid,
although it does not actually engage in the kind of
behavior characteristic of solid objects.

It does not

resist penetration, support other bodies or produce
tactual sensations in perceivers; it is nonetheless
solid, we believe.
a

If we are told that something is

material object, we believe that it is solid even

if,

because of its environment, it fails to act in ways

which are common to solid things.
It is just as natural,

I

think, to say that the

cube in question is colored, has a certain degree of
heat, and has a certain degree of hardness, even though
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no light, warms nothing and is touched by

nothing.

If we say that to be colored is to have some

sort of surface structure, that to have heat is to have
some degree of mean molecular kinetic energy, and that
to have some degree of hardness is to have some level

of mean molecular density, then it is obvious that the

solitary cube must have all these properties.

If,

on the other hand, we say that in order to have

a

particular secondary quality an object must actually
appear to some sentient creature in some particular
way

,

we make a requirement for secondary quality posses-

sion without making a corresponding requirement in the
case of primary qualities.

I

doubt that there is any

non-question-begging justification for such

mination among qualities.

a

discri-

There is an enduring preju-

dice that objects have secondary qualities only if they
are actually perceived to have them, while objects have

primary qualities no matter what.

Since this belief is

not self-evident, it requires some supporting argument.
The argument would have to show not only that secondary

qualities are not identifiable with intrinsic physical
features of objects but also that the secondary qualities
are not identifiable with dispositions to behave in

particular ways.
be filled.

It is unlikely that this tall order can
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There is a view which entails that secondary
qualities
are inessential to material objects in that
they are not

possessed by material objects at all, but rather
qualify

mental entities only.

The arguments for this view, however,

are notoriously weak.

The view that secondary qualities

are possessed only by mental entities will be fully
dis-

cussed in the following chapter.
I

think we should conclude, then, that (E5) is

inadequate to the task of distinguishing primary from
secondary qualities.

It does, of course, draw a dis-

tinction among qualities of objects, but that distinction bears little resemblance to the traditional one.

Since (E5) fails,

(E3)

must fail as well, in just the same

way; it calls primary some qualities which are usually

classified as secondary and some which are traditionally

conceived as belonging outside of the primary-secondary
quality grouping altogether.
Conclusion
The Lockean passages we have examined have failed
to yield a satisfactory solution to the problem of how

to distinguish primary from secondary qualities.

have discussed three versions of the distinction.

We
The

first, that primary qualities are more often perceived in
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objects than are the secondary qualities
is simply false.
When we introduced the notion of an optimal
kind of
perception, we found that at least some of the
secondary

qualities are to be constantly found in bodies
perceived
under optimal conditions.
The second version, that it is inconceivable that
a

body lack any of the primary qualities, was dismissed

as difficult to evaluate unless it is interpreted
as

to the third view, that bodies possess primary
*5'^^lities

necessarily while they possess secondary quali-

ties only contingently.
view, however.

There are problems with this

One, perhaps minor, problem is that the

traditional primary qualities are not the only ones that

physical objects possess necessarily; similarly, contingent possession by physical objects does not distinguish
the secondary qualities from all others.

The more serious

problem is that it is doubtful that all of the traditional
secondary qualities are only contingently possessed by

macroscopic physical objects.

It appears that objects

could not fail to have at least some of the traditional

secondaries, e.g., color, hardness or softness, roughness
or smoothness, temperature.

If we hope to discover a

way of distinguishing between the traditional primary
and the traditional secondary qualities we should move
in some other direction.
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Perhaps, however, we need not make too sharp a turn.

We have been restricting our attention to macroscopic

physical objects.

We might, instead, concentrate on

the microconstituents of those objects and ask whether,
at the microscopic level, objects have primary qualities

necessarily and secondary qualities only contingently,
or not at

Chapter VI.

all.

This project will be undertaken in

,

.

.
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CHAPTER

III

Two of Locke's versions of the primary-secondary

quality distinction are so intertwined in both the Lockean
passages and the work of Locke's commentators that they

merit examination

together.

One of these is what histo-

rians of philosophy often call the Berkeley-Reid inter-

P^^tation of Locke
(hereafter, BR)

.

s

primary— secondary quality distinction

The other version we can call the

Resemblance Thesis (hereafter, RT)
Typically, BR is characterized as the view that Locke
takes primary qualities to be real, objective qualities of

objects while what we call secondary qualities are not in
fact qualities of physical objects, but rather ideas,

sensibilia, or, perhaps, qualities possessed by sensibilia.
Some of Locke's arguments for RT presuppose the truth of
BR.

RT is expressed by Locke's claim that ideas of primary

qualities are "resemblances" of them while ideas of secondary qualities do not "resemble" anything in the object.

Many of Berkeley's and most of Reid's attacks on Locke are

directed toward this doctrine.
In this chapter
as much as possible.

I

shall deal with BR and RT separately
First,

I

shall consider Locke's version

of BR, his arguments for it, and Berkeley's criticisms of
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them.

I

shall also consider an additional argument
for

something like BR which has been offered recently
by J.L.
Mackie.
Second, I shall discuss Locke's version
of and

arguments for RT

,

criticisms of it from both Berkeley

and Reid, and further considerations in its favor
from

Mackie.

I

hope to show that both BR and RT are seri-

ously defective.

Finally,

I

shall consider a contem-

porary version of a primary-secondary quality distinction

which combines BR and RT.

I

do this in order to point

out the futility of trying to draw a primary-secondary

quality distinction along such lines.
The Berkeley-Reid Interpretation of Locke
The following three quotations from contemporary

scholars of British Empiricism are representative of the

standard reading of Berkeley and Reid.

Jonathan Bennett

writes

What Berkeley attacked was the thesis
that, while primary qualities are in
objects, secondary are not because they
are ideas and are therefore in the mind."^
Reginald Jackson tells us that
the distinction which Locke was supposed
by Berkeley and Reid to have drawn, is
between qualities of bodies
and
ideas, sensations, or in current terminology, sensibilia (supposed not to exist
independently of the perception of them
and to be the effects of the action of
^
bodies on minds.)
.

.

.

,
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In discussing Berkeley's attack on Locke's
distinction

between primary and secondary qualities, D.M.
Armstrong
says

The moral Berkeley draws from this is
that, since the secondary qualities are
confessedly mere "ideas," the primary
qualities must be equally "ideas"
he points out that some of the arguments
that Locke used to try to establish the
subjectivity of the secondary qualities,
would, if valid, apply equally to the
3
primary qualities.
.

.

.

Both Berkeley and Reid have been criticized by
commentators for misinterpreting Locke.

Reginald

Jackson says of Locke's primary-secondary quality

distinction that it
has been represented, both by Locke's
immediate successors and by a number
of modern critics, in a way which is
not only opposed to Locke's definitions of these terms, but which is
also most awkwardly related to his
distinction between "Qualities" and
^
"Ideas."

After stating that Berkeley and Reid attribute BR to
Locke, Jackson tells us that Locke's distinction is one

between qualities (primary) and powers (secondary)

.

One

of Jackson's motives for attacking Berkeley and Reid is

charity to Locke.

Locke does announce that he intends

to distinguish among kinds of qualities, not between

qualities and ideas.

Furthermore, a quality-power dis-

tinction is incompatible with BR inasmuch as powers.
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even if fundamentally different from qualities,
are
"in", at least in the sense of attributable
to,

objects.

That BR violates Locke's stated intentions

is a reason for thinking that Locke does not
hold BR.

Jonathan Bennett, who, like Jackson, attributes
to Locke a quality-power distinction,

errs in his interpretation of Locke.

thinks Berkeley

^

Although Bennett

^^^lizes that Locke says many things that sound very

much like BR, he blames their presence in the Essay
to carelessness on Locke's part.

According to Bennett,

Berkeley was taken in by Locke's comments that secondary qualities are not "in" the object.

occurs at II,viii,17 of the Essay

One such comment

:

But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness,
are no more really in them (bodied than
sickness or pain is in manna.

Bennett dismisses Berkeley's interpretation of Locke
by saying.

Locke's 'not in the object' remarks
about secondary qualities are
flimsy and inconsiderable; we cannot explain them except through his
having somehow drifted from his
central insight
and really
that is all that can be said about
.

.

them.

.

.

.

.

°

Bennett is right when he implies that we cannot reconcile
Locke's "not in the object" remarks with the rest of his

discussion of primary and secondary qualities.

Bennett

^
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suggests three reasons why Locke drifts into
speaking
of secondary qualities as if they were
mere ideas

.

The most plausible of these is that Locke
takes too

seriously his comparison between secondary qualities
and pains, sickness and the like and slips into equating secondary qualities with mental states.

Whatever

the reason, it is certain that Locke frequently indul-

ges in ways of expressing himself which strongly suggest
a theory like BR.

In paragraphs 16-20 of Book II, chapter viii, Locke

presents four arguments, ostensibly in support of the

Resemblance Thesis, which he has just stated at II, viii,
15.

The first three lean heavily on the notion that

secondary qualities exist only when they are being perceived.

Here Locke opens the door for the attribution

to him of BR.

In other places where Locke suggests BR,

it is plausible that he is indulging in his usual careless-

ness about the use of the word 'idea', but the objective-

subjective distinction is made so blatantly in this portion of the discussion that one can conclude only that

Locke makes it intentionally.

Thus Berkeley and Reid,

in attributing BR to Locke, make no more serious an error

than do Bennett and others in attributing a quality-power

distinction to Locke; in their attempts to saddle Locke
with a consistent position, they ignore those sections

.

.
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of the

Es^

which conflict with their chosen
interpre-

tations
It IS worth noting at this
point that those die-

hards who wish to maintain in the
face of contrary
evidence that Locke never holds anything
like BR will
have difficulty interpreting Locke's
arguments
in

II, viii, 16-20 in such a way that
they have any force at

all.

A look at the arguments will make this
point
clearer.
After comparing the warmth of fire with
the
pain it produces, Locke says.
Light, heat, whiteness, or coldness are
no more really in them [fire and snowj
than sickness or pain is in manna.
Take away the sensation of them; let
not the eyes see light or colors, nor
the ears hear sound; let the palate
not taste, nor the nose smell, and all
colors, tastes, odours, and sounds, as
they are such particular ideas, vanish
and cease, and are reduced to their
causes, i.e., bulk, figure, motion of
parts
(II viii ,17)
,

the secondary gualities of manna Locke says.

Why the pain and sickness, ideas that
are the effect of the manna, should
be thought to be nowhere when they
are not felt; and yet the sweetness
and whiteness, effects of the same
manna on other parts of the body, by
ways equally as unknown, should be
thought to exist in the manna, when
they are not seen or tasted would need
some reason to explain.
(II, viii, 18)

.

)
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Locke continues,
Let us consider the red and white
colours in porphyry.
Hinder light
from striking on it, and its colours
vanish.
(II viii 19)
,

,

It could be argued that in these passages, Locke is
not

trying to persuade us of BR

— that

secondary qualities

exist only while they are perceived

— but

rather that

ideas of secondary qualities exist only while they are

perceived.

This latter claim, of course, does little

to support BR and is at least consistent with a quality-

power distinction.

But it is obvious that it says

nothing about ideas of secondary qualities which is not

equally true of ideas of primary qualities.

One should

wonder why Locke would go to so much trouble to point
out that some ideas are mind-dependent, an assertion

which supports no primary-secondary quality distinction
because only trivially true.
It is more natural to conclude that in these pas-

sages Locke identifies secondary qualities with secondary

quality ideas and distinguishes them from their physical
causes, the primary qualities of objects.

Secondary

qualities exist only while they are being perceived, in

contrast to the primary qualities of bodies, which "are
really in them --whether anyone's senses perceive them
,

or no

(

II viii 17
,

,

,
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To evaluate Locke's primary-secondary
quality

*^^2ti^ction here, we need to reconstruct his line
of

reasoning.

Locke offers two sorts of arguments to show

that secondary qualities are mind-dependent.

One sort

compares secondary qualities with pains and other mental

phenomena and concludes on that basis that secondary
qualities are subjective.

The other sort of argument

attempts to show that secondary qualities vary with the

condition of the observer and the environment--e g
.

.

the colors of the porphyry vanish when the lights go out;
no alteration need be made in a physical object in order
to change its secondary qualities, hence these qualities

cannot be in physical objects.

Having established to

his satisfaction that secondary qualities are not in
the object, Locke concludes that the only qualities

objects really possess are the primaries (and perhaps
the tertiaries)

.

Since there is every reason to believe

that secondary quality ideas

(secondary qualities) are

caused by some quality or collection of qualities in
objects, it must be that secondary quality ideas are

caused by the primary qualities.

Hence we have BR, an

objective-subjective primary-secondary quality distinction.

Locke's reasoning here is seriously flawed.
both of Locke's arguments for BR are defective.

First,
As
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Berkeley has shown so well, the arguments Locke uses
to try to prove that secondary qualities are
mind-depen-

dent work just as well to show that primary qualities
are mind— dependent

In the first case, Locke gives us

.

no reason to think that an analogy exists between pains

and secondary quality ideas which does not also hold

between pains and primary quality ideas, and in the
second case, Locke ignores the obvious fact that pri-

mary quality ideas vary as much with the condition of
the percipient as do secondary quality ideas.
rnore,

Further-

Locke seems to forget what he suggests earlier

in the Essay

,

that secondary qualities may be identi-

fied with the powers of bodies to produce certain kinds
of ideas and may thus be considered real, objective

qualities of objects.
Berkeley's treatment of Locke and his arguments
against BR are very familiar, but
facts about them.

I

wish to stress two

One it is certain that Berkeley

attributes BR to Locke.
They who assert that figures, motion,
and the rest of the primary or original
qualities do exist without the mind in
unthinking substances do at the same
time acknowledge that colors, sounds,
heat, cold, and suchlike sensations
do not which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that
depend on and are occasioned by the
different size, texture, and motion of
the minute particles of matter.

—

63

Two, Berkeley's arguments against BR are based
on the

assumption that arguments similar to the ones Locke uses
to show the subjectivity of secondary qualities
can be

used to show the subjectivity of primary qualities as
well, and, as has been pointed out many times, Berkeley

never endorses these arguments but rather uses them to
reveal an inconsistency in Locke.
In short,

let anyone consider those
arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colors and
tastes exist only in the mind and
he shall find they may with equal
force be brought to prove the same
thing of extension, figure, and
motion.
Though it must be confessed
this method of arguing does not so
much prove that there is no extension or color in an outward object
as that we do not know by sense which
is the true extension or color of
^
the object.

Berkeley's arguments against Locke here are decisive.
Locke never succeeds in isolating important features
of secondary quality ideas that are not shared by primary

quality ideas.
There are philosophers, however, who are not convinced
by Berkeley's arguments.

Mackie.

One such commentator is J.

L.

In a recent book, Mackie asserts, like

Jackson and Bennett, that Berkeley distorted Locke's

primary-secondary quality distinction.^^

It is diffi-

cult to know exactly what to say about Mackie

's

attack

.
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because it seems misdirected.

Mackie attributes to Locke

primary-secondary quality distinction that combines
RT with a dispositional-non-dispositional
quality
a

dis-

tinction, and it is this sort of view which Mackie
wishes
to defend against Berkeley.

Berkeley

s

Mackie claims to find that

arguments are largely ineffective and con-

cludes that the Berkeleyan assault is no threat to

Locke's primary-secondary quality distinction.

Mackie
two ways.

s

project does a disservice to Berkeley in

One, although Mackie evaluates Berkeley's

arguments as criticisms of a primary-secondary quality

distinction

that combines RT with the assertion that

secondary qualities are, unlike the primaries, mere
dispositions, Berkeley's arguments in the passages

Mackie discusses are in fact directed towards

a dif-

ferent view, namely, a combination of BR and RT.

Second,

Mackie conpletely ignores Berkeley's arguments against
RT,

fundamental part of the view that Mackie wants to

a

defend

Mackie deigns to take somewhat seriously three of
Berkeley's arguments.

The rest, he says,

"amount to

little more than ingenious satire and rhetoric.
The first argument is really a set of arguments in which

Berkeley tries to show that illusions occur as frequently
in primary quality perception as in secondary quality
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perception.

Mackie explains,

Berkeley develops at great length the
argument that illusions occur equally
in our perception of primary qualities.
This argument he quickly waves aside.

But this, as we have seen, is simply
beside the point, since the distinction does not rest at all upon the
mere fact that illusions occur with
the secondary qualities.
In this discussion Mackie seems to be saying, first,

that Berkeley takes it that Locke's case for a pri-

mary-secondary quality distinction rests heavily on the
f^ct that illusions sometimes occur in secondary quality

perception.

In response to this, Mackie says, Berkeley

proceeds to point out that primary quality perception

often produces illusions too.

Mackie then hastens to

inform us that Locke's primary-secondary quality dis-

tinction depends very little, if at all, on the fact
that illusions occur in secondary quality perception.
He concludes that since Berkeley's arguments are aimed
at a consideration upon which Locke does not rely, they
are, for the most part, irrelevant.
It remains to account for Mackie

's

refusal to

acknowledge these arguments as critical to Locke's
position.

This can be simply explained.

Mackie be-

lieves that Locke proposes an adequate primary-secondary

quality distinction, yet he recognizes that several of
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the passages in Book II, chapter vii
of the Essay are, if
taken as arguments for the distinction,
not very strong.
Therefore, he ignores them as arguments.
As we will see,

Mackie believes that the strongest argument
in favor of

primary-secondary quality distinction is an ontological
economy argument provided by the physical
a

sciences.

Because of this, he chooses to overlook some of
the more
familiar arguments that Locke presents.

Mackie discusses two more of Berkeley's arguments:
the argument that all sensible qualities seem to
coexist
in the same place, and the argument that it is impossible
to conceive of an object that has primary qualities

but no secondary qualities.

both of these.
them here.

I

Mackie ultimately rejects

do not wish to deal with either of

The latter has been discussed in Chapter II,

and the former is, as Mackie suggests, question-begging

against a view which maintains that things are not always
as they seem.

As we have noted, Mackie rejects BR in favor of a

marriage between RT and a dispositional analysis of
secondary qualities.

However, in defending his view,

Mackie presents an argument which could conceivably be
used in support of BR, or at least in support of one part
of BR, the view that objects do not possess secondary

qualities.

Mackie 's argument concerns the way material

67

objects are supposedly conceived
of and dealt with by the
physical sciences. Mackie reminds
us that Locke was
moved by developments in the science
of
his day.

He

points out that,
It had long been known that sound
is a
vibration in the air, and Hooke, Huygens,
and Newton were trying out wave and
corpuscular theories of light. In the development of any such theory it is simply
superfluous to postulate that there are,
in material objects, in the air, or in
the light, qualities which are at all
like
sounds as we hear sounds or colours as
we see colours.

Mackie adds.
the literal ascription of colours as
we see colours, and the like, to material
things, to light, and so on, forms no
part of the explanation of what goes on
in the physical world in the processes
^hich lead on to our having the sensations
and perceptions that we have, but, by
contrast the features actually used in the
construction of such explanations still
include spatial position and arrangement and
motions (of various sorts) of items most
of which are countable at least in princi.

.

.

ple.

From these two quotations it is clear how Mackie
argument proceeds.

's

One notes that while the Lockean

primary qualities play an essential role in scientific

explanation of the behavior of physical objects, the
secondary qualities play no role at all.

Then, using

a principle of ontological economy which adjures the

philosopher to refrain from postulating the existence of
entities which serve no explanatory purpose, one concludes

.

.
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that material objects possess no secondary qualities.

Such an argument would, if sound, support BR,

Mackie draws a more cautious conclusion from his
premises, however.

He concludes that

the physical considerations
show that
there is no good reason for postulating
thoroughly objective features which^ resemble our ideas of secondary qualities.
.

.

.

.

.

.

In other words, Mackie uses the argument to support a

version of RT, and it might be argued that the "physical
considerations" do, in fact, do more to support RT than
BR.

I

am not concerned to debate this issue.

I

believe

that both philosophers and interested laymen have, if

only informally, allowed the argument from the physical
sciences to convince them that something like BR is true.
The argument has great popular persuasive power, and

I

believe that a discussion of its merits is warranted
here

Mackie mentions one tempting criticism of the argu-

ment

.

It is often suggested that the so-called
primary qualities are merely those in which
physicists are specially interested, perhaps
because they lend themselves more than
others to measurement and to use in mathematically formulated theories, but that
those of us who have other interests need
not defer to such base mechanical preferences 17

Mackie responds that this criticism misses the point,
and he is right.

Those who might offer this criticism
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seem to forget that the objects of the physicist's

interest are not arbitrarily chosen, nor are they selected on the basis of ease of measurement or mathematical

handling.

In fact, as

I

understand it, several entities

in which physicists are specially interested defy at-

tempts both to measure them and to fit them neatly into

mathematically formulated theories.

Presumably, a

physicist becomes interested in an entity because he
finds he needs it to complete his description of a

particular phenomenon and loses interest in it when it
becomes apparent that the postulation of its existence
is superfluous to a complete description of any parti-

cular phenomenon.

The point of the argument from the

physical sciences is not that philosophers should make
the concerns of the physicist their own just because they

are the concerns of the physicist, but rather that the

philosopher should attend to the ontology of the physicist because he postulates and rejects entities for

philosophically interesting reasons.
The problem with arguing from the physical sciences
to BR is fundamental:

it is not at all clear what it means

to say that the physical sciences are unconcerned with

the secondary qualities of objects.

argument will make this clearer.

A careful look at the

We might formulate that

part of the argument that deals with the secondary qualities
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in this way;
(1)

For any property, F, such that the assumption
that a material object has F is irrelevant to
an adequate scientific hypothesis concerning
that object's behavior and interaction with
other objects, it may be assumed that the object lacks F.

(2)

All of the secondary qualities are such that,
for any material object, x, the assumption that
X has any one of them is irrelevant to an adequate scientific hypothesis concerning x's
behavior and interaction with other objects.

(3)

It may be assumed that all material objects
lack all of the secondary qualities.

Premise

(1)

is an attempt to express the principle of

ontological economy that Mackie has in mind.

I

have

misgivings about its truth and its faithfulness to
whatever principle Mackie wishes to employ here, but

I

am confident that if anything, it errs in being stronger

than it need be, and

I

am willing to grant it to any

proponent of this argument.

The rest of the argument,

which is concerned with the primary qualities, might
proceed this way:
(4)

(5)

For any property, F, if the assumption that
a material object has F is necessary to an
adequate scientific hypothesis concerning
that object's behavior and interaction with
other objects, it may be assumed that the
object has F.
All of the determinable primary qualities are
such that for any material object, x, the
assumption that x has them is necessary to
an adequate hypothesis concerning x's behavior and interaction with other objects.
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(6)

It may be assumed that all material
objects
have all of the determinable primary

qualities.^®

The controversial premise here is, of course,
premise
(2)

.

In order to evaluate it, we need to have a
theory

about the nature of secondary qualities.

If the secondary

qualities are taken to be intrinsic physical features
of material objects, features like having a
particular

level of mean molecular kinetic energy, then premise
is patently false.
a role in

(2)

Such properties do, of course, play

scientific hypotheses about objects.

If the

secondary qualities are taken to be dispositions of

objects to interact with other objects in certain ways,

properties such as being disposed to reflect light
waves of some frequency or other, then again,
clearly false.

If, on the other hand,

(2)

is

secondary qualities

are taken to be dispositions of objects to appear to

sentient creatures in particular ways, then
plausibility.

(2)

has some

Suppose, then, we assume that secondary

qualities are dispositions to appear in certain ways,
decide on that basis that
accept (3).

(2)

is true and therefore

We would be in the unenviable position of

holding that objects do not have dispositions to appear
in certain ways to sentient creatures.

Since it is

undeniable that objects do have such dispositions, we

might be tempted to reject premise

(1)

of the argument.

It is far more certain that objects do in fact have
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dispositions to appear in particular ways to sentient
creatures than that

(1)

is true.

I

doubt that a pro-

ponent of the argument would want to offer this account
of secondary qualities.

There is a further view about the nature of secondary
*3^^iities on which

(2)

is clearly true.

That, of course,

is the view that the secondary qualities are mental

phenomena or properties of mental phenomena.

Obviously,

though, to analyze secondary qualities in this way is to
beg the question at hand.

The argument from the physical sciences, then,

cannot support BR.

Those who use it and find it con-

vincing must be assuming part of what they want to
prove, that the secondary qualities are identifiable

with mental phenomena or features of those phenomena in
a way that the

primary qualities are not.

In concluding

his discussion of the argument, Mackie makes a telling

comment.

He says.

But I have no doubt that most people who
use colour words are commonly inclined to
that may be indibelieve something
cated by saying that colours as we see
them belong intrinsically to the (illuminated) surfaces of material objects.
.

I

.

.

am not sure what it means to say that colors as we

see them belong intrinsically to the illuminated surfaces
of material objects; perhaps it means that if we could

see objects as they really are, our perceptions of them
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unmediated by our sense apparatus, we would see
that they
have colors. Or perhaps it means that God, who
sees

the things themselves intimately, and thoroughly

perceives them
But

I

.

.

."20 3003 that objects have
color.

hasten to add that, although

the meaning of that claim,

I

I

am uncertain about

am fairly sure that the

denial of BR does not entail that the claim is true.
The view that color is something laid over the surfaces
of objects may well be believed by most people, but

I

doubt that it is believed by most philosophers who
reject BR, and it will not do to support BR by appealing
to the apparent falsity of this mystifying view.

We have discussed three kinds of arguments in favor
of BR, two of them straight from Locke's Essay and the

third a contemporary one in a traditional Lockean spirit.
The first compares secondary qualities with pains and

certain other mental phenomena.

The second points out

that variations in secondary quality perceptions occur

even when the perceived object remains unchanged.

The

third appeals to the work of physical scientists who
find certain hypotheses about secondary quality possession
by material objects superfluous to their concerns.

None of the three is successful in showing that there is
some compelling reason to believe that secondary qualities

exist only in the mind that is not also a reason to

.
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believe the same of primary qualities.

Neither the

Lockean reasoning nor the more contemporary argument
provides us with good evidence that BR is true.

We

turn, then, to RT.

The Resemblance Thesis

Locke's statement of the Resemblance Thesis is this:
The ideas of primary qualities of bodies
are resemblances of them, and their patterns
do really exist in the bodies themselves,
but the ideas produced in us by these
secondary qualities have no resemblance of
them at all.
There is nothing like our
ideas, existing in the bodies themselves

Although Locke's statement of the Resemblance Thesis is
perhaps hopelessly obscure, both Berkeley and Reid think
they understand it, although they differ somewhat in

their interpretations of it.

Here is one of the passages in which Berkeley

attributes RT to Locke.
The ideas we have of these the secondary
qualities they acknowledge not to be the
resemblances of anything existing without
the mind, or unperceived, but they will
have our ideas of the primary qualities to
be patterns or images of things which
exist without the mind, in an unthinking
substance which they call "matter.
In arguing against RT, Berkeley employs his famous

Likeness Principle, that nothing can be like an idea
but another idea.

An idea can be like nothing but an idea;
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a colour or figure can be like nothing
but another colour or figure.
If we look
but never so little into our thoughts, we
shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our
ideas.

Berkeley offers little or no support for the Likeness
Principle.
Hence,

I

He seems to think it is obviously true.

think we should give the simplest possible

interpretation to the Likeness Principle and Berkeley's
reasons for holding it.^"^
The passage above suggests an argument for the Like-

ness Principle that is relatively simple, truly

Berkeleyan in spirit and unfortunately, invalid.

The

hint lies in Berkeley's prediction that introspection

will reveal that it is "impossible for us to conceive
a likeness except only between our ideas."

It is tempting

to read this statement as constituting an argument anal-

ogous to the "tree in the quad" argument in paragraph
of the Principles

.

23

If we can conceive of resemblance

only between ideas, then, if only what is conceivable is
possible, resemblance can obtain only between ideas.

We are now assured that nothing can be like an idea but

another idea, because nothing but ideas can resemble
anything.

We can readily imagine a Berkeleyan defense of

the first premise of this argument: try to conceive of
a pair of resembling things, one member of which is not

an idea.

Of course, we are unable to do this, and can

76

grant Berkeley the first premise.

This first premise,

however, together with the second premise, does
not

entail

the conclusion.

To make the point clearer, we

should make the first premise more explicit.
(1)

It is impossible that there is a pair of things,
X and y
at least one of which is not an idea,
such that we conceive that x resembles y.
,

The second premise might be expressed this way:
(2)

Whatever is inconceivable is impossible.

It is clear that

(1)

and

together do not yield the

(2)

conclusion Berkeley wants.

The premise which would,

with (2), yield the appropriate conclusion is (1*).
(1*)

It is inconceivable that there is a pair of
things, x and y, at least one of which is not
an idea, such that x resembles y.

It is well known that when Berkeley uses the term

'conceive', he usually means something like 'form a

mental image'.

If we take conception to be this sort

of mental act, then (1*) has some plausibility.

reading 'conceive' and hence,

However,

'inconceivable', in the

Berkeleyan manner, it is doubtful that

(2)

is true.

It

is not the case that only those things we can mentally

picture are possible; it is probable that no one

can

picture a chiliagon, yet surely it is possible that such
things exist.

If

(2)

is to seem plausible, conception

must be taken to be the act of considering or entertaining,
an act whose object is a proposition and which does not
,

.
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necessarily involve any mental images.
of conception in this way,

(1*)

Yet if we think

seems false.

It seems,

for example, that even Berkeley might
admit that we can

conceive (in the sense specified) that there are
two
spirits which resemble one another, yet surely
spirits
are not ideas.
One way to attempt to justify

resemblance to be

between entities.
oris

(1*)

is to take

matter of perceived similarity

a

Then to say that two things resemble

another is to say that they look alike or smell

alike or taste alike and so on.

For Berkeley, then,

resemblance, in this sense, would be a relation that

could obtain only among ideas or sensations, since these
are the only entities we directly perceive.
then, provide Berkeley with a defense of

(1*)

We could,
by sti-

pulating that two things can be said to resemble one
another only insofar as they can be directly perceived
to have similar features.

Since only ideas can be

directly perceived, only ideas can bear resemblance to
anything
The obvious problem here is that we need to justify

restricting the resemblance relation to perceived similarity.

Without such a restriction on resemblance

remains unsupported.

Since

(1*)

(1*)

figures in an argument

for a conclusion stronger than the Likeness Principle, we

.
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can abandon (1*) without thereby
admitting failure to
justify the Likeness Principle.
If we cannot provide
an argument for the conclusion that
only ideas can bear
resemblance relations, it may yet be possible
to find
a good reason to say that ideas can
resemble only one

another
The most obvious way to do this is to suppose,
as

Berkeley does, that if an entity is sensible, it can
resemble only another sensible entity.

Then, since

only ideas are sensible, it follows that an idea can

resemble nothing but another idea.

This line of argu-

ment occurs more than once in the Principles and the
Dialogues

.

In one of Berkeley's earliest discussions

of RT in the Principles

,

he says,

appeal to anyone, whether it be sense
to assert a colour is like something which
is invisible, hard or soft, like something
which is intangible, and so of the rest.^^
I

Near the close of the first Dialogue, Philonous, having

extracted from Hylas the Lockean doctrine that our ideas,
unlike their archetypes or originals, are sensible, asks.
But how can that which is sensible be
like that which is insensible? Can a
real thing, in itself invisible be like
a colour
or a real thing, which is not
audible be like a sound? In a word, can
anything be like a sensation or idea, but
another sensation or idea?^^
,

;

,

By Locke's own theory, all our perception of external

objects is mediated by sensa.

Since external objects are
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not themselves sensible, they cannot
resemble our ideas,
which are sensible entities.

Although
I

confess that

find this line of reasoning attractive,

I
I

can find nothing in Berkeley to support

the principle that sensible things can
resemble only

other sensible things.

Nor can

argument for this principle.

I

devise a convincing

Clearly, sensible things

can share many contingent properties with insensible
things, for example, existing in 1979

,

having been pro-

duced by God, having been discussed by Locke and
Berkeley, and so forth.

Since neither Locke nor

Berkeley considers such properties in defending or attacking claims of idea-object resemblance, it is pro-

bable that their notion of reseiriblance involves something

more than mere property-sharing.

Presumably/

it is

some special sort of property which must be shared if
two entities are to resemble one another.

Berkeley

apparently believes that resemblance to sensible entities
requires possession of sensible properties.

To support

this he might say that if a given entity, x, is sensible,

the way to find out if x is like some other entity, y,
is to sensibly experience both of them and then compare

the two objects.

If the comparison is impossible due

to the insensibility of y,

that X resembles y.

it would be nonsense to say

But since it is possible to make

comparisons between any two entities without directly
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experiencing them, this argument is very weak.

Berkeley could make one last effort and
point out
that in the context in which Locke discusses
idea-object

resemblance, he is mainly concerned with sensory
knowledge of material objects.

One might deduce from this

that in determinations of resemblance between
entities,
the relevant shared properties must be sensible
properties.

Since nothing but ideas has sensible properties,

all assertions of resemblance between ideas and insensible

items are false, at least in the context of discussing

knowledge gained through the senses.

Although this

suggestion may have some merit, it seems quite a departure from anything Berkeley actually says.

At this

point, it will be more profitable to turn to two other

Berkeleyan arguments against RT.
A brief comment in the Dialogues suggests a rather

persuasive argument against RT.

Near the end of the

first dialogue Philonous asks Hylas,
if you say it Can external thingj
resembles some one only of our ideas, how
shall we be able to distinguish the true
copy from all the false ones?27
.

.

.

Here Berkeley implies that although it may not be false
or meaningless to talk of resemblance between material

objects and ideas, we can in principle never know which
of our ideas are so related to objects and which are not.
To gain such knowledge would require direct inspection of

.
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material objects, which are, of course,
inaccessible to
us.
Berkeley is probably wrong if he means to
suggest
that the only way to attain knowledge of
material objects
is to inspect them directly.
There are other ways we

might come to know the nature of material objects;
we

might be able to reason to certain conclusions concerning
their properties, or God might reveal to us the true

nature of external objects.

However, since God has failed

to provide us with public revelations on these matters,

we must rely on our powers of reason to discover what

material objects are really like.

However, if the

Lockean theory of perception is correct, it is hard to
see how reason alone could convince us of the truth of

the Resemblance Thesis.

helpful here.

Locke is not particularly

Although he produces several arguments to

try to show that secondary quality ideas resemble

nothing in objects, he never offers any proof of his

contention that our primary quality ideas do resemble
qualities of physical objects.

Berkeley's scepticism

on this point seems well-founded.
A third argument against RT occurs earlier in the
same speech from which the last quotation was taken.

Philonous is challenging Hylas
How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas
should be copies or images of anything
fixed and constant? Or, in other words.
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since all sensible qualities, as size,
figure, colour, etc., that is, our
ideas,
are continually changing, upon
every alteration in the distance, medium or instruments of sensation; how can any
minate material objects be properly deterrepresented or painted forth by several
distinct
things, each of which is so different
from
and unlike the rest?^°

Berkeley seems to be pointing out that if,
as Locke's
theory holds, there are material objects,
they are

represented to us not by one constant idea or
stable
set of Ideas, but rather by ideas and
idea-complexes

which are fleeting and sometimes radically diverse
from
one another.

It is not altogether clear what Berkeley

is getting at here.

that

Perhaps what he wants to prove is

RT entails contradictions, that it is impossible

that all of our ideas of the primary qualities of any

object resemble all of the primary qualities of that
object.
as round,

For example, at one time

I

may see a tabletop

at another time elliptical.

If both my ideas

of the shape of the table resemble the shape of the
table, then the table is both round and elliptical.

Since this is impossible, it is false that both of my
ideas of the shape of the table can resemble the shape
of the table.

If this captures,

as

I

believe it does,

the spirit of Berkeley's third attack on RT, then surely

Berkeley's argument misses the mark.

RT does not entail

that when we perceive a physical object as having some
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determinate primary quality, the object in fact
has that
determinate quality. All Locke need claim is
that when
we perceive an object as having some determinate
primary
quality, the object we perceive has in fact a
property
that is a determinable of the determinate property
it

appears to have.
that when

I

In other words, RT does not entail

see a table as elliptical, the table that

I

see is elliptical; presumably, it entails only that when
I

see a table as elliptical, the table

I

see has shape.

Another possible way of interpreting the quotation
above is to attribute to Berkeley the view that ideas

cannot resemble external objects because ideas are variable and fleeting while external objects are, as Philonous

puts it, of a "stable and permanent"
fess

I

nature.

do not see the force of this argument.

I

I

con-

cannot

imagine on what grounds we might justify the assertion
that variable and fleeting entities cannot resemble

stable and permanent ones.

This way of dealing with RT is

not at all promising.
In spite of Berkeley's failure to present a deci-

sive refutation of the Resemblance Thesis, he succeeds
in casting doubt on the meaningfulness of saying that

some of our ideas resemble external objects.

Further,

he arouses suspicion as to the reasonableness of saying

that we can know that some of our ideas resemble external objects and that some do not.

Our conclusion at this
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point IS cautious, for Berkeley may have
failed to fully
understand Locke's notion of resemblance.
In Essay II of his Essays on

Intellectual Powers

of Man, Thomas Reid says these things about
Locke's
P^iniary— secondary guality distinction:

The ideas we have of the various qualities
of bodies are not all, as Mr. Locke thinks,
of the same kind.
Some of them are images
or resemblances of what is really in the
body; others are not.
There are certain
qualities inseparable from matter, such as
extension, solidity, figure, mobility. Our
ideas of these are real resemblances of the
qualities in the body, and these he calls
primary qualities; but colour, sound, taste,
smell, heat and cold, he calls secondary
qualities, and thinks that they are only
powers in bodies of producing certain sensations in us, which sensations have nothing resembling them, though they are
commonly thought to be exact resemblances
of something in the body.^^

might mention several paradoxes, which
Locke, though by no means fond of
paradoxes, was led into by this theory of
ideas.
Such as, that the secondary qualities of body are no qualities of body at all,
but sensations of the mind:
That the primary qualities of body are resemblances of
our sensations ...
I

Mr.

We can see in these passages that Reid attributes both

BR and RT to Locke and that he considers both to be
"paradoxical."

We should also note that Reid attributes

to Locke a view incompatible with BR, namely, the view

that secondary qualities are powers of bodies.

(Since

Locke endorses each of these views we can sympathize

with Reid's confusion on this point.)

In his discussions

^
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of Locke, Reid does not launch a
direct attack on BR, but
he does devote much attention to RT.
He uses Berkeley's

Likeness Principle in criticizing RT, but
his reasons
for accepting the Likeness Principle
are considerably

different from Berkeley's.
Reid's formulation of his criticism of RT
differs
from Berkeley's in that he rejects the locution
'idea of
a quality'

quality
of,

,

and substitutes 'sensation belonging to a
so what Locke and Berkeley would call the
idea

say, warmth, Reid would call the sensation
belonging

to or associated with the quality of warmth.

Reid's

^^iticism of RT is inspired in part by his rejection of
Locke's representational theory of perception.

While he

allows that our perception of secondary qualities is

mediated by sensations, he adopts

a

direct realist

account of primary quality perception.

Consider these

quotations from Reid:
our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of the primary qualities, and
inform^ us what they are in themselves ^
.

.

.

.

it is evident that our notion of primary qualities is not of this kind [relative]]
we know what they are, and not barely what
relation they bear to something else.^^
.

.

.

,

Reid adds that although we receive certain sensations
(pain, pressure,

etc.)

from primary qualities, we can dis-

tinguish between the sensation (what we feel) and the

quality (what we perceive).

Reid argues that Locke was

.
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mistaken in his assertion of resemblance
between primary
qualities and the sensations they produce.
had Mr Locke attended with sufficient
accuracy to the sensations which he was
everyday and every hour receiving from primary qualities, he would have seen, that
they
can as little resemble any quality of an
inanimated being, as pain can resemble a
cube or a circle.
.

.

.

.

In support of this contention, Reid appeals
to the Likeness

Principle
I have a clear and distinct notion of
each
of the primary qualities.
I have a clear
and distinct notion of sensation.
I can
compare the one with the other; and when
I do so, I am not able to discern a resembling feature.
Sensation is the act, or
the feeling, I dispute not which, of a

sentient being. Figure, divisibility,
solidity are neither acts nor feelings.
Sensation supposes a sentient being as its
subject; for a sensation that is not felt
by some sentient being, is an absurdity.
Figure and divisibility suppose a subject
that is figured and divisible, but not a
subject that is sentient.

Note that while Berkeley's rejection of RT seems to rely
on the alleged impossibility of comparing the two sorts of

entities thought to resemble one another, Reid's re-

jection of RT stems from his belief that we can compare
them, and that when we do, we shall not discern any re-

semblance in our subjects.
Reid defines sensation in this way:

Sensation is a name given by philosophers
to an act of mind, which may be distinguished from all others by this, that it
hath no object distinct from the act itself.
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Reid

s

sensation" is different from a Lockean or

Berkeleyan idea.

The main difference is that while Reid's

sensation is an objectless act, the idea of Locke and
is the object of some mental act.

This variance

does not substantively affect Reid's criticisms of RT.

Reid's version of the Likeness Principle seems to be that
a sensation cannot be like a quality.

It is difficult to

isolate from Reid's discussion the passages in which he

makes his case for the Likeness Principle.

The best candi-

dates are these statements:

Sensation is the act ... of a sentient
being
Figure, divisibility, solidity are neither acts nor feelings,
.

.

.

and

Sensation supposes a sentient being as its
subject;
Figure and divisibility
suppose a subject that is figure and divisible, but not a subject that is sen.

.

.

tient.
I

think we can admit that Reid points to some genuine

differences between sensations and qualities, but nothing
here is sufficient to show that there can be no resem-

blance of any kind between a sensation and a quality.
Perhaps Reid intends to make the claim that since

sensations are essentially experienced entities, a

sensation can be said to resemble another entity only if
they are experienced to be the same.

Qualities are not

experienced; rather they produce sensations which are
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experienced.

So qualities and sensations cannot be
said

to resemble one another.

it is unlikely, however, that

this is Reid's argument, for his direct realist
account
of primary quality perception implies that
some qualities

can be experienced directly.
Another, more likely, possibility is that Reid means
to say simply and boldly that no purely mental phenomenon

assemble a non-mental phenomenon.

If this claim were

true, then there would be no justification for saying that

any idea or sensation resembles any quality of a purely

material object.

Indeed, in at least two places, Reid in-

dicates that to postulate resemblance between our sensations and the qualities of a material object would be

tantamount to attributing the power of sensation to that
object.

He says.

The philosopher says, there is no heat in
the fire, meaning, that the fire has not
the sensation of heat
They [the vulgar3 know as well as the philosopher, that
the fire does not feel heat; and this is
all he means by saying there is no heat in
the fire.^^
.

.

.

Earlier he had said, in discussing the smell of

a rose.

But there can be nothing like to this sensation in the rose, because it is insentient.
To say then that an idea or sensation of solidity resem-

bles the quality solidity in an object would imply that
the object itself has this idea or sensation.

Since the

.

.

.
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object does not, it must be false that an
idea of solidity
can resemble the solidity of an object.
Unfortunately,
Reid derives this conclusion from a very
controversial

premise, that sensations can resemble only
sensations and
perhaps, other mental phenomena.
Therefore, I think that

Reid fails in his attempt to provide a priori
justification of his rejection of rt

He is more successful when

he turns to the empirical data available to us.

Reid argues that Locke's claim that ideas of primary

qualities resemble those qualities is contradicted by
experience and reason, and he accuses Locke of having
failed to devote sufficient attention to his own sensations and ideas to avoid his error.

Reid offers an

example
Let a man press his hand against a hard
body and let him attend to the sensation he feels, excluding from his thought
every thing external, even the body that is
the cause of his feeling.
This abstraction
indeed is difficult, and seems to have been
little, if at all, practised: but it is not
impossible, and it is evidently the only
way to understand the nature of the sensation.
A due attention to this sensation
will satisfy him, that it is no more like
hardness in a body, than the sensation of
sound is like vibration in the sounding
body
,

Reid explains,
I know of no ideas but my conceptions, and
my idea of hardness in a body, is the conception of such a cohesion of its parts as
requires great force to displace them. I
have both the conception and belief of this
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quality in the body, at the same time that
I have the sensation of pain,
by pressing
my hand against it.
The sensation and perception are closely conjoined by my constit^tion, but I am sure they have no similitude:
I know no reason why the one should
be called the idea of the other, which does
not lead us to call every natural effect
the idea of its cause.
Reid is quite convincing here; his assertion that the

sensation produced in us by touching

a hard

(or solid)

object does not resemble the quality of hardness or solidity as we conceive of or understand it is,
true.

I

think,

We can manufacture many other examples of complete

dissimilarity between our sensations of primary qualities
and those qualities as we conceive them to be.
the sensations produced in us by a moving body.

Consider
They

can range from a blurred image of the moving object to
a

sensation of pressure or even nausea if we ourselves

happen to be on or in the moving object.

These ideas or

sensations, far from resembling the phenomenon of change
of location, are so unlike motion that we can hardly find
a

basis on which to compare them.

Consider the feeling

associated with lifting a heavy object, the pain in one's
arms, the downward tug one feels.

What have these sensa-

tions to do with the phenomena of mass and gravity?

pencil

I

sensation

The

am holding has a point at one end; how could the
I

receive when

I

press that point to my finger

be like the molecular arrangement of the graphite which
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accounts for its pointedness?

We associate touching a

spherical object with a certain feeling of movement
in
our arms or the muscle tension involved in
cupping our
hands.

These sensations are nothing like what it is for

an object to be spherical.

visually by seeing

a

We experience size and shape

two-dimensional pattern of color and

shadow, and this experience has very little of interest
in common with what it is to have a number of molecules

arranged in a particular way.
Reid gives us a rather simple and intuitive under-

standing of Locke's contention that some of our sensations
"resemble" some of the properties of material objects:
roughly, to say that a sensation or idea resembles the

property which produces it is to say, in general, that
the idea we have of the property is like what it is to

have that property.

Reid does not explicate for us his

concept of the relation
need to do this.

like

,

but he really does not

A careful attention to our sensations

informs us that they are none of them in any way like

,

on any interpretation, either the primary or the secon-

dary qualities.

The most telling fact about this pro-

ject is that when we try to compare our sensations with

properties, we can neither find a common ground on which
to judge them nor imagine what form a resemblance between

them might take.
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Although Reid rejects RT, he believes, as we have
noted, that a distinction can be made between the primary

and secondary qualities.

Although Reid's distinction is

based on a direct realist account of primary quality per-

ception that Locke rejects, it deserves brief consideration
in this context.

Reid asks.

Is there a just foundation for this distinction? Is there any thing common to
the primary which belongs not to the secondary? And what is it?
I answer, that there appears to me
to be a real foundation for the distinction; and it is this: that our senses
give us a direct and distinct notion of
the primary qualities, and inform us
what they are in themselves but of the
secondary qualities, our senses give us

only a relative and obscure notion.
They inform us only, that there are qualities that affect us in a certain manner,
that is, produce in us a certain sensation;
but as to what they are in themselves,
our senses leave us in the dark.^^

Although not itself a version of RT, the primary-secondary
quality distinction suggested by this passage is worth

discussing in conjuntion with RT.

The passage suggests

that ordinary perception, unabetted by special instru-

ments or sophisticated scientific theory, enables us to

make accurate inferences about the nature of the primary
qualities while it fails to enable us to make accurate
inferences about the nature of the secondary qualities.
For example, seeing and feeling sizes and shapes causes
us to reason correctly about these sizes and shapes.

On

.
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the other hand, color perception suggests to us that
color
is something spread over the surfaces of objects
while in

fact being colored involves reflecting light of certain

wavelengths
Even if we ignore the puzzle of how we could, employing a Lockean theory of perception, justify our claims to

understand the true nature of the primary and secondary
qualities of external objects, this version of RT is unpromising for two reasons.

One,

in some cases, ordinary

perception alone is not sufficient to enable us to reach
a full or accurate understanding of the nature of the

primary qualities.

It may be true that our senses inform

us what shape and size are, but ordinary perception

does not provide us with even a piece of the theory of

mutual attraction of bodies which accounts for the phe-

nomenon of weight or the nature of that repulsion between entities which accounts for solidity.

Indeed, our

senses are quite misleading with regard to the primary

qualities.

We perceive many objects as being continuous

chunks of inactive stuff; we know now that this picture
is inaccurate.

Second, in at least one case, ordinary

experience allows us to make fairly accurate inferences
about the nature of secondary qualities.

Episodes of

smelling incline us to believe that something leaves the

object and wafts through the air toward us, and this is.
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in fact, what is happening when we smell
objects.
J.L. Mackie,

in defending his version of Locke's

primary-secondary quality distinction, employs both
the
notion of resemblance that Reid dealt with and
something
like the idea discussed above.

When Locke states the

Resemblance Thesis, Mackie says, he
means, surely, that material things literally
have shapes as we see shapes, feel shapes,
and think of shapes, that things move in
just the sort of way in which we see, feel,
and think of things moving, and so on.
But
he cannot mean that we never make mistakes
Essentially what he must be claiming
is that material things have, for example,
shapes which are determinations of the same
determinable or category, shape in general,
as are the shapes seen, felt, or thought
of
colours as we see them are totally
different not only from the powers to produce such sensations, with which Locke equates the secondary qualities, but also
from the ground or basis of these powers in
the things we call coloured.
This ground,
Locke thinks, will be only some arrangement and motion of the minute parts of
surfaces of these things: no colour as we
see colour, no determinate within that category at all, is literally in or on the
things.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Mackie tries to compress some pretty murky notions into
the phrase "shapes as we see shapes, feel shapes, and

think of shapes."

He may be referring to the sensations

we receive when we perceive shapes visually or tactually,
or perhaps he is referring just to the concept of shape,

the way we "think of" shapes.

If he is doing either,

the

considerations discussed above are sufficient to show he

.
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IS mistaken in his claim that some
special relationship

exists between the primary qualities and their
ideas
that does not also obtain between at least some
of the

secondary qualities and their ideas.

difficult to know what various

Although it is very

philosophers have in

mind when they talk about primary quality-primary
quality idea resemblance, it is hard to see how, using
any notion of resemblance, ideas of,

solidity

say,

can resemble solidity while ideas of hardness and softness

do not resemble those qualities.

Mackie says nothing enlightening.

He seems to have

only the vaguest concept of quality-idea resemblance.
He is convinced that our color experiences are unlike

any properties of physical objects, but he seems to for-

get that many of our experiences of shape are just

a

com-

plex of color experience plus sensations of pressure.
I

fail to see how the latter experience can resemble any

property of objects if the former cannot.

From Reid and Mackie we have culled two possible

interpretations of RT.

Both seem implausible, so if we

are to find an attractive version of RT, we should look

elsewhere
We have yet to discuss in this context Locke's own

arguments for RT.
Essay

.

They occur at II viii 16-20 of the
,

,

They concern the warmth of fire, the whiteness and
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sweetness of manna and the colors of porphyry.

As

I

sta-

ted earlier, they are all, in part, attempts
to show that

secondary qualities exist only while they are being
perceived.
For Locke, it is a short step from this position, BR, to RT.

Secondary qualities are like pain,

ideas produced in us by physical objects.

The pain pro-

duced by a physical object is not a quality of that object, nor, presumably, does it resemble any quality of that

object.

For example, a pointed object coming in contact

flesh can cause pain, but the pain in no way resembles its cause.

By analogy, then, secondary qualities do

not resemble their causes.

It is clear that part of

Locke's support for RT is BR.
We can reconstruct Locke's reasoning here in a way

which suggests a new version of RT.

Since according to

BR objects possess no secondary qualities, secondary

quality ideas are caused by the primary qualities.

Pri-

mary quality ideas are also caused by the primary qualities.

Primary quality ideas, then, differ from the secondary
quality ideas with respect to the relation they bear to
their causes.

The cause of an idea

of,

say,

squareness is

the particular squareness of a physical object, while the

cause of an idea of redness is not the particular redness
of a physical object, but rather some or all of its pri-

mary qualities.

Secondary quality ideas are like pain in
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that the cause of pain is not pain in
the object, and the
cause of a secondary quality idea is not
a corresponding
quality in the object. Locke is here making
a primary-

secondary quality idea distinction, rather
than a distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
It would be difficult to formulate precisely
Locke's

conclusion here.

Resemblance seems to be a matter of a

kind of correspondence between ideas and their
causes;

primary quality ideas have it with their causes and
secondary quality ideas lack it.

There is no need to

this because the reasoning behind it is defective.

Since Locke offers no convincing arguments for BR,

the first and most crucial premise of the argument for
this view is unsupported.
In our examination of various views on primary

quality-idea resemblance, we have found no precise statement about the nature of such resemblance, while we have
found good reason to think RT must be false, either because resemblance is explicated in such a way as to make
it apparent that primary quality ideas cannot resemble

their causes or because resemblance is explicated in such
a way as to suggest that some secondary quality ideas

must resemble their causes.

Perhaps the best way to

treat RT as we have seen it presented so far is not to
stress its apparent falsity but rather to complain that it

.

.
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is insufficiently precise to evaluate,

RT borders on incomprehensibility.
I

to suggest that

To close the chapter,

wish to deal with a contemporary theory that is clear

enough to be dealt with confidently.

BR and RT Combined
Recently, Keith Campbell"^^ has made a thorough-

going attempt at a primary-secondary quality distinction
that is spiritually akin to Locke

'

s

Resemblance Thesis

and also involves an objective-subjective quality distinction.

Campbell begins his discussion with a fairly

typical expression of the alleged difference between

primary and secondary qualities.
The idea at work in distinguishing primary
from secondary qualities is the idea that
some qualities are objective, and belong
to the natures of things, while others
are subjective, that is, enter experience
only because of the character of the experiencer

Campbell continues,
it is not possible to analyze what
it is for an object to have a secondary
quality without referring to how it seems
to some observer, and in this sense, objects would not have secondary qualities
if there were no perceivers
.

.

.

For Campbell, the objectivity of primary qualities consists in the fact that we can analyze what it is for an

object to have a particular primary quality without re-

.
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f erring

to how it appears to any observer, by referring

solely to its behavior patterns.

Bearers of primary

qualities display distinctive patterns of interaction

with other bodies.
For ex^ple, cubes don't just look and
feel different from spheres. The behavior
of cubes on inclined planes and sets of
steps is different.
There are differences in the bouncing behavior, the
stacking behavior, results of rotation,
in whether they pass through holes of
various shapes, in how much paint is
needed to cover them, and so forth indefinitely
.

Campbell suggests:
(Cl)

Quality Q is primary if and only if all and
only those objects which have Q display a
distinctive pattern of behavior in interaction with the inanimate environment

For ease of reference we might call the distinctive

pattern of behavior that objects which have Q display
in interaction with the inanimate environment Q-distinc-

tive behavior and amend Campbell's criterion to:
(C2)

Quality Q is primary iff there is a Q-distinctive
pattern of behavior in interaction with
the inanimate environment which all and
only objects which have Q display.

Campbell does not offer us an analogous criterion for

deciding which qualities are secondary.

The most rea-

sonable possibility is:
(C3)

Quality Q is secondary iff there is no Q-distinctive pattern of behavior in interaction
with the inanimate environment which all
and only objects which have Q display.

.
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CdmpbGll doGS not go so far as to say that thG SGcondary

qualitiGS arG

itiGrG

idGas.

RathGr thG subjGctivity of

SGcondary qualitios is supposGd to consist in thoir

obsGrvGr-dGpGndGncG
HowGVGr,

(C2)

and

(C3)

do not SGrvG to distinguish

primary from SGCondary qualitios:

possGssion of SGcon-

dary qualities by physical objects does indeed correlate with their behavior, and if objectivity is a matter
of distinctive behavior alone, then secondary qualities

are as objective as the primary.

Bennett points out that

brown apples are usually more squashable
than green ones, blue flames boil water
faster than yellow ones, a red surface reflects lightwaves of different lengths from
those reflected by a blue surface, and so
on.

In fact, we can correlate every secondary quality of

material objects with some sort of behavior pattern:

red

objects reflect light of certain wavelengths; bitter
things have such and such concentrations of certain substances; hot objects have a certain degree of molecular

energy; soft things have a certain distribution of particles; fragrant things emit certain sorts of micro-

scopic entities, etc.

Someone might object that, say, not everything that
looks red exhibits red-distinctive behavior.
a

For example,

white object and a pink object may both look red under

a red light,

but when they are brought into the sunlight

,
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they behave in distinct ways.

The objection fails inas-

much as we are entitled to distinguish real from apparent
colors, tastes, and the like.

Just as not all things

that look spherical are spherical, not all things that
look red are red.

Not everything that looks spherical

exhibits sphere-distinctive behavior; only things which
are spherical exhibit sphere-distinctive behavior.

Things that are red--i.e., behave in a particular way in

sunlight

— behave

in ways similar to one another under

all sorts of observation conditions.

We can set standards

for determining when an object is red; we can devise tests
for redness that do not rely on popular reports.

These

tests would be complicated and technical, but no more so

than a test to determine true sphericity.
Campbell, too, finds fault with his distinction.

He

says

Objects which we see as different in colour
clearly have different effects on us
we must suppose that to different perceived
qualities correspond different effects produced in the brain by the objects perceived
these different effects in the brain
are produced in accordance with the laws goevery qualiverning inanimate nature
ty is, in consequence, primary.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

In other words, given that perception of colors, tastes,

sounds, smells, textures, etc., involves brain activity,
it happens that all the so-called secondary qualities are

such that their bearers display various distinctive beha-
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vior patterns and are therefore primary qualities.

Campbell thinks a remnant of a distinction can be
salvaged by distinguishing perceived qualities from their

objective correlates, those features of
objects in virtue of which they give rise
to perceptions of one or another quality.
He says that for any perceived quality, its objective

correlate is a primary quality.
But the primacy of every objective correlate does not of itself ensure that every
perceived quality is a primary
Leaving illusions aside, the objective correlate of perceived solidity is solidity.
The objective correlate of perceived
sphericity is sphericity, and likewise for
position, distance, or relative motion.
But the objective correlate of perceived
warmth is mean molecular energy.
.

.

.

We can express Campbell's intuition with two criteria.
(C4)

Perceived quality Q is primary iff the objective
correlate of Q is Q.

(C5)

Perceived quality Q is secondary iff the objective
correlate of Q is distinct from Q.

This contemporary version of Locke's resemblance

criterion, like its predecessor, fails to distinguish

among qualities of physical objects and distinguishes

instead among perceived qualities.
and (C5)

as models,

We can, using

(C4j

devise criteria for distinguishing

among qualities of physical objects.

We can introduce

the notion of a subjective correlate of an objective

quality; our subjective correlates will be what Campbell

calls perceived qualities.

Consider:
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Quality Q is primary iff the subjective correlate

(C6)

of Q is Q.

Quality Q is secondary iff the subjective correlate of Q is distinct from Q.
requires a slight restriction.

(C6)

as we should,

If,

we distinguish between real and apparent qualities, the
following problem arises.

We know that objects often

present delusive appearances.

For example, round things

look elliptical when viewed from certain angles.

Campbell tells us that the objective correlate of a

perceived quality is that feature of an object in virtue
of which it gives rise to the perception of the perceived

quality.

It seems, then,

that in the case of a round thing

appearing elliptical, ellipticality is the subjective

correlate of roundness.
ellipticality,

(C6)

Since roundness is distinct from

yields the unfortunate result that

roundness is a primary quality when producing veridical

appearances and a secondary quality when producing delusive appearances.

tricting the range of
lities

This problem can be solved by res'Q'

in (C6)

to determinable qua-

.

The results yielded by the restricted

(C6)

vary

depending on which views of property identity one adopts.
If one adopts the scientific realist view that all the

traditional secondary qualities are identical with intrinsic physical features of objects--e.g

.

,

one identi-

,
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fies warmth with mean molecular kinetic energy
(C6)

— then

legislates that all qualities, subjective and ob-

jective, are primary and thereby fails to make any sort
of primary-secondary quality distinction.

If, on the

other hand, one adopts a view which distinguishes some
secondary qualities from any collection of intrinsic

physical features of objects

— e.g.,

warmth from mean molecular energy--

one distinguishes
(C6)

yields the result

that having some level or other of mean molecular kinetic

energy is secondary, since it is distinct from its sub-

jective correlate.

This result is incompatible with

Campbell's objective-subjective distinction, for surely
we can analyze what it is for a thing to have some level
or other of mean molecular kinetic energy without making

reference to perceivers.

Since the need for such a refer-

ence is, for Campbell, the mark of the secondary qualities,

having some level or other of mean molecular kinetic
energy cannot be a secondary quality.
Campbell, who recognizes the failure of his effort,

concludes that we have two alternatives: like D.M.

Armstrong^^

we can identify the traditional secondaries

with some collection of qualities we call primary--e

.

g

warmth with mean molecular kinetic enerqy--and thereby
deny that there is any distinction among qualities, or
we can readmit as secondaries such qualities

.
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as felt warmth and sound as heard.

The second alternative, favored by Campbell, is as much
an abandonment of a primary-secondary quality distinction
as the first.

It has the further defect that there is no

justification for it.
Concluding Remarks

We have seen that in one section of the Essay

,

Locke

seems to suggest that BR and RT together will serve to

distinguish primary from secondary qualities.

Locke's

attempt fails, and by using Campbell's resurrection of
the attempt as an example,

I

have tried to show that any

enterprise along these lines is doomed.

Indeed, it is not

surprising to find that when we combine two defective
theories we fail to produce one adequate theory.
All versions of BR must fail because ultimately they

amount to either the simple claim that all qualities are
primary, an abandonment of a quality distinction, or the

unjustifiable singling out of

a small

group of perceived

qualities and dubbing these "secondary qualities" on
account of features they share with most, if not all, perceived qualities.
unclarity.

Attempts at RT fail largely due to

When we try to resolve their unclarity,

perceived
they seem to fall into three groups: views about

similarity between qualities and sensa; views about
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quality-concept similarity; and views about qualitysharing between objects and sensa.

I

have suggested

that none of these three views is successful.

Berkeley's

arguments are victorious over the first; Reid's arguments

defeat the second; and the third is unjustifiable insofar
as it must rely on BR, itself a failure.

...

.
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CHAPTER

I

V

At II, viii, 19-20, Locke offers an argument
v/hich

suggests that one way to distinguish primary from
secondary
qualities is by consideration of the conditions
under which
an object can gain or lose a particular sort
of quality.

The argument implies that a crucial difference
between pri-

mary and secondary qualities is that an object cannot
lose
or gain a primary quality without undergoing some sort
of

physical change or alteration, v/hile objects can (and often
do)

gain and lose secondary qualities without any accompany-

ing physical alteration.

Although Locke does not rely

heavily on this version of a primary-secondary quality distinction, it is,

I

think, initially appealing and merits

brief consideration.
The vagueness of the notion of a physical alteration

makes it difficult to evaluate this view.

Nevertheless,

I

intend to show that on a plausible interpretation of the

expression 'physical alteration,' this position considered
alone fails to distinguish among the qualities which physical objects possess.

The argument in which Locke hints that primary and

secondary qualities differ with regard to alterability
109
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concerns the colors of porphyry.

I

of the porphyry argument in Chapter

suggested a formulation
Here is an amended

I.

version, free of extraneous considerations.
(1)

When the light is shut off, the color of
the
porphyry vanishes.

(2)

When the light is shut off, no alteration is
made in the porphyry.

(3)

If, when the light is shut off,

the color of
the porphyry vanishes and no alteration is
made
in the porphyry, then the porphyry's loss
of
color does not require an alteration of the

porphyry.

The porphyry's loss of color does not require an
alteration of the porphyry.

(4)

Presumably, this argument can be generalized to show that
for any object and any secondary quality of that object, the

object

s

loss of the secondary quality does not require an

alteration of the object.

Jonathan Bennett^ discusses

a

possible situation in

which, because of a change in the human tasting mechanism,
a

substance changes from bitter to tasteless, i.e., it loses

one of its secondary qualities without having undergone any

physical change.

Robert Cummins, in a recent article,

as-

serts that if everyone were blind, nothing would be blue;

more generally, if everyone suddenly lost his sight, all
objects would lose one of their secondary qualities, namely,
being colored.
In the situations described by Locke, Bennett and

Cummins, an object, without having changed physically, loses

Ill

one of its determinable secondary
qualities.

in other, per-

haps more familiar discussions of
secondary qualities, we
are told that objects can lose
determinate secondary qualities without undergoing a physical change.
That wine is
bitter to a sick man, that objects change
color under different lights, that train whistles change
pitch all of

—

these are supposed to be examples of how an
object can lose
a

determinate secondary quality solely because of

a

change

in the environment or in the condition of the
percipient.
In contrast to the secondaries, it is sometimes

thought, determinate primary qualities cannot be lost solely

because of a change in the environment or in the condition
of the observer.

For example, even if everyone were to lose

the senses of sight and touch, there would still be objects

which are square, round, etc.

Similarly, no mere change in

the environment would result in an object's changing its

size or mass.

To make these changes, say these intuitions,

we must make a physical change in the object.

These intuitions suggest this version of

a

primary-

secondary quality distinction;
(A)

Quality Q is primary iff
(x)
(x is a body and
X loses Q at t Z? X undergoes a physical alteration at t)

Quality Q is secondary iff <^(Ex) (x is a body
and X loses Q at t and x^oes not undergo a
physical alteration at t)
We can allow Q to range over both determinable and determin-

ate qualities; however, it is doubtful that objects can ever

,

.
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lose any of their determinable primary
qualities.

The view

that they cannot is the view that
primary qualities are somehow essential to bodies and is discussed
fully in Chapter II.
The one restriction we need make is
to limit the range of Q
to contingent qualities, as defined in
Chapter II.

^

This is

to avoid the unhappy result that all
necessary properties of

bodies are primary.
Some clarification of the notion of a physical
alter-

ation is necessary.

Obviously,

v;e

cannot define a physical

alteration as a quality change, for then we would beg the

question against proponents of the view under consideration.
If we take a physical object to be a collection of
molecules

of a certain chemical composition in a particular arrange-

ment, we can sketch a criterion of physical alteration.
(PA)

Although

A body, x, undergoes a physical alteration iff
either (i) the number of molecules which constitute X increases or decreases
or
(ii) one or more of the molecules v;hich
constitute x changes in chemical composition.
or
(iii) one or more of the molecules which
constitute x changes its position
relative to the others
or
(iv) some force is exerted upon x.
(PA)

is only a rough and inexact account of the

phenomenon of physical alteration, we can see that determinate primary quality changes do require that something
like what is described by (i)-(iv) occur.

usually requires

(i)

or

change of mass requires

(iii)
(i)

or

A change in shape

as does a change of size.
(iv)

A

A change in degree of

,
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solidity requires
tion requires

effected by
(A)

(ii)

(iv)

(li)

or

(iii).

change in determinate mo-

Some primary quality changes can be

.

alone.

It appears that the first part of

expresses a truth.
The second part of

which says that a body may

(A)

gain or lose a secondary quality without undergoing
a physical alteration, is supported by arguments similar to
Locke's

prophyry argument.

Premise

(2)

of the porphyry argument is

supported by our rough analysis of physical alteration.
When the light that was shining on the porphyry is shut off,
none of the four conditions of (PA) need be met.

The por-

phyry need not gain or lose molecules or change in chemical
composition; its molecules need not be rearranged, nor need
there be any force exerted on the porphyry.

The shutting

off of the light does not cause any of these events, and

although any one of them may occur, they all may fail to
occur when the light is shut off.
The support for premise

that for premise

(2).

(1)

is more elusive than

On the Berkeley-Reid interpretation

of Locke's distinction, which holds that secondary qualities

are mere sensa,

(1)

is justified by the fact that the red

and white sensa produced by the porphyry disappear when the

light is shut off.

But, as

I

tried to show in Chapter III,

there is no compelling reason to identify secondary qualities with sensa or qualities of sensa which is not also a

reason for identifying primary qualities with sensa.

In

^

"

114

that case, if premise

(1)

of the porphyry argument is true,

then analogous statements about primary quality
changes are
true as well (e.g.
as I walk away from the table, its shape
,

changes)

.

From this we could generate arguments which con-

clude that primary quality changes in objects do not
require

physical alterations, thus blurring the distinction we are
trying to make.

Worse, on a dispositional analysis of

secondary qualities, premise

(1)

of the porphyry is false.

On a theory which holds that secondary qualities are

^®ither sensa nor dispositions but simply garden— variety
properties, the support for premise

(1)

of the porphyry

argument seems to be that after the lights are shut off, a

perceiver would no longer see any colors when he looked at
the porphyry.

It appears to a percipient that the porphyry

has lost its colors or changed color from red and white to
black.

From this we are to conclude that the porphyry has

lost or changed its colors.

In effect, the holders of

(A)

ask us to abandon, to some degree or other, the appearance-

reality dichotomy in the case of secondary qualities while

maintaining it in the case of the primaries.

But they can

give us no reason to do so without appealing to some other

version of the primary-secondary quality distinction.

With-

in the confines of the present view, we can give no reply to

the objector who says,

"When the lights are shut off, the

porphyry is still red and white, just as grass is green at
night.

.
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To be fair here, we must distinguish
two interpreta-

tions of
(a)

Objects have just those secondary qualities
that
they appear to have.

One natural reading is

^
in

object has a particular secondary quality just
case someone perceives the object as having
that quality.

(a')

If a person sees a cube as blue

(that is, the cube appears

to that person the way blue things normally appear
in sun-

light)

,

then the cube is blue.

This view has familiar

problems; it entails that objects can have contradictory

properties, a result which is tolerable if we identify

properties with the ways in which things appear but repellant if we are speaking, as we are, of garden-variety

properties.

No one who did not already believe that secon-

dary qualities are in some sense subjective would be tempted
to assert

(a')

and it can be rejected without regret in

favor of another reading of
(a'')

On

(a'')/

(a)

An object has a particular secondary quality
just in case most normal percipients perceive
it as having that quality.
a

white object under a red light is really red,

since normal percipients see it as such, while one or two

aberrant percipients' perceiving an object as red is not
sufficient condition of its being red.

a

This second view

does, in a way, distinguish between real and apparent secon-

dary qualities, and it supports premise

(1)

of the porphyry

.

.

,

.
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argument.

(a'')

antithetical to
(b)

(b)

can be contrasted with a third position,
(a)

An object has a particular secondary quality
just in case normal percipients, under standard
observation conditions, perceive it as having
that quality.

entails that a white object appearing red under

a red

light is not red inasmuch as it does not appear red under

standard observation conditions.

If

accept

vie

(b)

we must

say that objects cannot lose their real secondary qualities

undergoing a physical alteration.

Changes of color

require painting, dyeing or bleaching, changes of taste in-

volve chemical changes in the constituent molecules of the

tasted substances or the addition of new substances, and so
forth.

We cannot change the secondary qualities of a body

merely by changing the environment or the conditions of the
perceiver; to do that v/ould be to do no more than change the

apparent secondary qualities of the object.
cept

(b)

we must reject

Thus if we ac-

(A)

In order to evaluate

(A)

minds whether to accept (a'') or

we must have made up our
(b)

I

can think of no

good reason to accept (a'') which does not either constitute
or rely upon some argument for the subjectivity of secondary

qualities.

Presumably, then, if we accept (a’’) and (A), it

is because we believe that secondary qualities are in some

way subjective or mind-dependent while primary qualities are
in some way objective and mind-independent.

But in that
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case, we will have already formulated
a primary-secondary

quality distinction to which the present
view is not central
Thus, this attempt at a primary-secondary
quality
distinction is inadequate to distinguish
between primary and
secondary qualities. At best, it is entailed
by some cor-

rect formulation of the primary-secondary
quality distinction, but It is unhelpful by itself.

Without theoretical

backing it is merely controversial and provides
its adherents with no replies to their critics.

Footnotes
and Armstrong, eds
Locke and Berkeley
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1968).
2.
Two Troublesome Claims about Qualities
in Locke's
Lssay,
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pp. 401-418.
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42.

See Chapter V.
The special case where standards of normality
change is
no exception to this claim.
This issue is discussed more
fully in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER
In this chapter,

tempts to draw

a

I

V

wish to consider

a set of

at-

primary-secondary quality distinction which

have one feature in common: they all say that the
secondary

qualities of material objects are dispositions of
objects to
behave in certain ways under certain circumstances.
In

addi-

tion, it is part of all but one of the views

I

consider that

the primary qualities of objects are non-dispositional

remaining view, the last

I

The

.

will discuss, takes primary

qualities to be dispositions, but of

a

different sort from

the dispositions that are secondary qualities.

I

am not par-

ticularly concerned with these positions as interpretations
of Locke, but rather as contemporary attempts to solve the

perennial problem of how to distinguish between primary and
secondary qualities.
tions

I

I

will argue that none of the formula-

discuss is a successful version of a primary-

secondary quality distinction.

In addition,

I

discuss some

minor, but often overlooked, consequences of adopting the

position that secondary qualities are dispositions.

Although the list of Lockean secondary qualities is
restricted to color, smell, taste, sound "and other the like
sensible qualities,"^ at least one of the philosophers

I

dis-

cuss expands the list to include qualities like agreeable-
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ness and depressiveness.

in the main, however,

I

shall be

concerned with the traditional secondary
qualities: color,
smell, taste, sound and the various
tactual qualities, heat
and cold, smoothness, and the like.
I

A few of the usual quotations from Locke will
serve
as an introduction to the view that secondary
qualities are

mere dispositions.

At II, viii, 10 of his Essay

,

Locke says.

Secondly such qualities which in truth are nothing
the objects themselves but powers to produce
various sensations in us by their primary qualities,
i.e., by the bulk, figure, texture, and motions of
their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes,
etc.
These I call secondary qualities.
,

Later we read:
a violet,

by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter, of peculiar figures and bulks,
and of different degrees and modifications of their
motions, causes the ideas of the blue colour, and
sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our
minds.
(II, viii, 13)

And later:
Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes
see light or colours, nor the ears hear sounds;
let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and
all colours, tastes, odours, and sound, as they are
such particular ideas vanish and cease, and are
reduced to their causes, i.e., bulk, figure, and
motion of parts.
(II/ viii, 17)
,

These three quotations express three points, some or all of

which are made by each of the philosophers

I

discuss:

(1)

secondary qualities are powers of objects to produce sensations in humans;

(2)

secondary qualities depend in some way
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on primary qualities; and

(3)

secondary qualities are dis-

positional in nature, the various
dispositions being exercised at various times depending on
external conditions and
the state of the observer.

In the preface of his book Locke,
Berkeley, Hume

.

Jonathan Bennett makes it clear that his concerns
are only
secondarily historical.^ In his discussion of
primary and
secondary qualities, Bennett takes himself to be
proposing
a sound

distinction between the two sorts of quality.
Bennett briefly discusses the view that primary

qualities are essential to bodies and that secondary qualities are inessential to them.

"safe enough."

He thinks this theory is

Although he finds no obvious faults with

this account, he goes on to consider in a much more serious

way what he calls the Analytic Thesis.

Bennett begins by wondering what it means to sav
that a thing has a certain power to produce a certain sensation in a human.

He decides that by 'x is green' all that

is meant is that if a human being were related to x in a

certain way then x would affect that person 'greenly.'

He

concludes that "any statement attributing a secondary quality to a thing is equivalent to a counter factual of the form
If X stood in relation R to a normal human, the
human would have a sensory idea of such and such
a kind.

Presumably, what Bennett means by all this is that every
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proposition that attributes a secondary
quality to an object
IS equivalent to some proposition
which asserts that under
certain conditions, a normal human percipient
of the object
will have sensory experiences of a particular
kind.
Bennett's language here is misleading because
it
seems to imply that for each proposition attributing
a

secondary quality to an object there is just one
counterfactual that is strictly equivalent to it.

What Bennett

should say is that each proposition attributing a
secondary

quality to an object is strictly equivalent to any one of

a

large set of propositions, each one of which mentions posol^servation conditions and then predicts that a normal

human percipient of the object under those conditions will
have a sensory experience of such and such a kind.

As an

example, consider the proposition that the walls of

m.y

office are white.

It v/ould be equivalent to the proposition

that a normal human percipient who sees the walls of my

office under fluorescent lights will have a visual experience of white.

Also, it would be equivalent to the proposi-

tion that a normal human percipient wearing violet-tinted

contact lenses who sees the walls of my office under fluorescent lighting will have a visual experience of pale violet.
If the Analytic Thesis is correct,

there are virtually an

infinite number of such propositions to which the proposition that my office walls are white is equivalent.
In addition to the Analytic Thesis, Bennett proposes
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what he calls the Causal Thesis.

The Causal Thesis is sup-

posed to capture Locke's intuition that
an object's secondary qualities are somehow caused by or
dependent upon its
primary qualities. Bennett's final formulation
of the

Causal Thesis is this:
There is some primary quality
such that: x is
and it is a causal law that if anything is both
and F then it is
(p

What

I

(p

(p

think Bennett means by the Causal Thesis is that

there are natural laws governing the behavior of objects
and their percipients which correlate the possession of

P^^ticular determinate primary qualities by objects with
dispositions to appear to normal humans in particular ways.
For example, the skin of a ripe Macintosh apple has a certain physical structure, that is, a certain set of determinate primary qualities.

Normal humans have a certain kind

of sensory apparatus and brain structure.

It also happens

that the skin of a ripe Macintosh apple looks red in sunlight to normal humans.

The Causal Thesis tells us,

I

be-

lieve, that the disposition of the apple to appear this way
to us is a consequence of its having the particular primary

qualities that it does together with the operation of laws

which determine the relations among the physical structures
of objects, the behavior of light, the functioning of human

sensory apparatus and finally, the subjective features of

human perceptual experiences.
a

If the primary qualities of

Macintosh apple were changed significantly, the apple

,
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would likely be disposed to produce
different visual experiences in normal human percipients.
The Causal Thesis tells
us that the primary qualities play a
crucial role in determining what sorts of visual, tactual, olfactory,
auditory
and gustatory experiences we will have in our
interactions
with physical objects.
The Analytic and Causal Theses together are supposed
to incorporate several allegedly Lockean claims.

Bennett

says

call attention to three features of the Analytic
Thesis.
(1) According to it, secondary qualities
are dispositional
'x is green' is equivalent to a
counter! actual conditional.
(2) It represents
secondary qualities as relational
'x is green'
means something about items (people) other than x,
and could become false just because of a monadic
change in those other things.
(3) It represents
secondary qualities as involving something mental;
'x is green' means something about the occurrence
of a certain kind of idea.^
I

;

;

In addition,

the Causal Thesis is supposed to express the

view that an object's secondary qualities are causally dependent upon its primary qualities.

From Bennett's discus-

sion we can construct a criterion for determining which

qualities are secondary.
(Bl)

Quality Q is secondary iff (i) There is some
primary quality, P, such that it is possible that some physical object, x, has P
and (ii) there is a causal law that if any
physical object, x, has P and stands in
relation R to a normal human, the human
will have a sensory idea of Q.

Bennett does not specify what relation R is.

(Bl)

will be

most plausible if we stipulate that relation R is the

.
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relation

^ons

perceive d under standard observation condi-

by.

Let us therefore amend (Bl) to:

Quality Q is secondary iff (i) There is some
primary quality, P, distinct from Q, such
that it is possible that some physical
object, X, has P
and (ii) there is a causal law that if any
physical object, x, has P and x is perceived under standard observation conditions by a normal human, the human will
have a sensory idea of Q.

(B2)

We should note at this point that P may, even must,
be a

very complex property.

The specification that P be distinct

from Q is added to try to insure that the traditional pri-

mary qualities fail to fulfill the requirements for being
secondary
There are serious problems with

(B2)

reference to primary qualities in condition
ing.

First, the

.

(i)

is disturb-

Bennett has given us very little hint as to how we are

to determine which qualities are primary.

Second,

I

am

suspicious that in spite of our effort to prevent it, some
of the Lockean primary qualities would turn out to be

secondary if we employ

(B2)

as a criterion.

My suspicion

rests on the supposition that if there are laws that connect

primary quality possession with secondary quality possession,
there are probably laws which connect the possession of some

primary qualities with the possession of others.
us roughly that a quality, Q,

(B2)

tells

is secondary just in case there

are primary qualities possession of which by objects disposes

those objects to produce sensory ideas of Q in normal humans

.
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under standard observation conditions.

primary qualities size and shape.
intimately related.

Now consider the

The two qualities are

It is impossible for any object to have

one without the other, and

I

believe that an object's having

either quality disposes it to produce sensory ideas
of the
other in normal humans under standard observation
conditions.

Given this, it seems as though both shape and size

fulfill the requirements of

(B2)

This problem arises because Bennett has not suc-

ceeded in isolating any feature of secondary qualities that
is clearly peculiar to them.

Bennett believes that secon-

dary qualities are dispositional, relational, involve something mental and are dependent on primary qualities, but an

argument is needed to show why we may not describe primarv
qualities in the same way.

Bennett recognizes this problem

and tries to provide such an argument.

I

quote it in full.

The Analytic Thesis says that a thing's having a
given secondary quality is its having a certain
power; and just this, prescinded from any question
of what sort of power, is inapplicable to the
primary qualities of things. We can identify a
glass, say, while remaining ignorant or in disagreement over its secondary qualities; and so we
have the notion of the glass as an object which,
among other facts about it, has certain 'powers'
to affect us in ways which are our basis for
crediting it with colour, taste etc. But we cannot identify a glass independently of all its
primary qualities such as location, size, shape,
etc.
and so we cannot have the notion of the glass
as an object which, among other facts about it, affects us in ways which are our basis for crediting
Granted that everything
it with primary qualities.
we say about the glass is based on sensory states
it causes us to have, it is still misleading to
;
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^

speak of
power to make us perceive it as having
certain shape, size, etc.; for that way
of speaking suggests that we have some notion
of it
some
way of identifying and studying the
glass~indepenaentiy of, and as a preliminary to, discovering
v;hat
Its primary qualities are.®
a

—

Bennett seems to be saying that we cannot identify
something
as a physical object while remaining
ignorant of or in dis-

agreement over its primary qualities.

The notion of a dis-

position of an object is epistemologically posterior to the
notion of the object itself, but in order to have an idea
object itself, we have to have ideas of its primary
qualities.

So primary qualities can't be mere dispositions.

Bennett's argument is rather muddled.

It is clear

that we can identify something as a physical object while

ignorant of or in disagreement over all its determinate

primary qualities.
which

I

I

can point to a red thing to my left

suspect is a physical object and wonder how big,

how solid, and what shape it is.

I

can also be in doubt as

to whether there is only one red object or two, and whether
it is moving or at rest.

I

may not be able to identify it

without considering its location relative to other patches
in my visual field, but surely relative location within a

visual field is not to be considered a primary quality.
Furthermore, if
thing,

I

reach out and happen to touch the red

it is reasonable for me to think. Why, this red thing

is solid!

I

am on my way to discovering that it is indeed a

physical object, but nothing precludes me from saying that

a
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physical object is a "something,

I

know not what" with the

disposition to produce in me sensations of
solidity, motion
and the like.
Perhaps Bennett is thinking not of determinate
pri-

mary qualities but rather of determinable primaries.

Now

it may be true that we cannot determine whether
something we

perceive is a physical object while in ignorance about
whether or not it has primary qualities, but
same is true of secondary qualities.

I

think the

We sometimes pick out

physical objects by hearing, smelling or tasting them, and
we usually pick out a physical object by seeing it or feeling it.

We can identify a thing as a physical object with-

out hearing, smelling or tasting it, but if we tried but

could neither see it nor touch it, we would not be justified
in calling it a physical object.

color in it, then

v/e

If we can perceive no

cannot see it, and if we perceive no

texture in it, then we cannot feel it.

Therefore in order

to identify a perceived thing as a physical object one needs
to perceive it to have at least one secondary quality.

This

is not a sufficient condition for such an identification,

but it is a necessary condition.

The choice for Bennett is

clear: he can either abandon the argument above or decide

that at least some secondary qualities are not dispositional
for the same reasons he offers to show that primary qualities are not dispositional.

The latter alternative involves

abandoning his views about the nature of secondary qualities.
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and the former alternative entails that
the primary-

secondary quality distinction Bennett offers
fails to do
its job.

A novel account of the distinction between primary
and secondary qualities is offered by J.J.C. Smart in

"Sensations and Brain Processes."^

First of all, let me introduce the concept of a
normal percipient
One person is more a nomal
percipient than another if he can make color discriminations that the other cannot. For example,
if A can pick a lettuce leaf out of a heap of*
cabbage leaves whereas B cannot though he can
pick a lettuce leaf out of a heap of beetroot
leaves, then A is more normal than B.
From
the concept of "more normal than" it is easy to
see how we can introduce the concept of "normal."
In this case the concept of a normal percipient is a slightly idealized one. ...
I say
that "This is red" means something roughly like
"A normal percipient would not easily pick this
out of a clump of geranium petals though he would
pick it out of a clump of lettuce leaves."
This account of secondary qualities explains their
unimportance in physics. For obviously the discriminations and lack of discriminations made by
a very complex neurophysiological mechanism are
hardly likely to correspond to simple and nonarbitrary distinctions in nature.
I therefore elucidate colors as powers, in
Locke's sense, to evoke certain sorts of discriminatory responses in human beings. They are also,
of course, powers to cause sensations in human
beings (an account still nearer Locke's).
.

,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Like Bennett, Smart says little here to help us decide what

characterizes primary qualities.

Presumably, since secon-

dary qualities are dispositions to cause discriminatory responses in human beings, primary qualities are not such

dispositions.

Smart's passage hints that unlike secondary

.
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qualities, primary qualities are at least
"simple and nonarbitrary distinctions in nature." what
else they are

remains something of

a

mystery.

Let us attribute to Smart

this criterion for identifying secondary
qualities;
(S)

Quality Q is secondary iff (i) it is possible
that
there is a physical object, x, such that x has
and

(ii) Q is a disposition to cause Q-like dis^^^^i^utory responses in normal human percipi-

ents.

To say that Q is a disposition to cause certain
responses in

humans is to say, roughly, that Q is to be analyzed by means
of a counterf actual

,

the antecedent of which specifies cer-

tain sorts of observation conditions and the consequent of

which describes some piece of human behavior.

tentatively that

a

We'll say

Q-like discriminatory response is the

picking out of objects which exhibit Q from those which
don t
'

(S)

is plagued with a number of difficulties.

too vague to be of much use.

It is

In spite of Smart's elaborate

attempt to specify what a normal percipient is, it remains
unclear whether his notion of "normal percipient" corresponds with the usual one.

Smart's "normal percipient" seems

to be able to make finer discriminations than the rest of us.

This,

I

think, would wreak havoc with our ideas of the real,

as opposed to the apparent, colors, tastes, smells, etc., of

physical objects.

If Smart's normal percipient declares

grass and oak leaves to be of radically different colors, we
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^h^ll

h3.VG to

taks his woird for it.

A more serious problem involves the notion
of
like discriminatory response.

a Q-

If to have Q involves nothing

more than having the power to evoke Q-like
discriminatory
responses, one wonders on what basis normal humans make Qlike discriminatory responses.

These responses are not

caused by differences in our perceptual experiences, since
Q is not a sensible quality.

Ordinarily we would say that

we distinguish geranium petals from lettuce leaves on the

basis of their color

,

which we determine by attending to the

differing visual experiences they produce in us; that is, we
r^otice that geranium petals are red and that lettuce leaves

are green and make a discrim.inatory response based on what

we have noticed.

But if

(S)

is true,

to notice the color

of geranium petals is simply to notice that we make such and

such a discriminatory response in the presence of geranium
petals.

We can wonder v;hat it is about geranium petals, if

not their color, which causes or enables us to make dis-

criminatory responses.

D.M. Armstrong raises this question

in a discussion of Smart's treatment of secondary qualities.

Armstrong says.
Suppose there are a number of pieces of cloth which
are not discriminable in respect of shape, size or
texture but that some of them are a certain shade of
I
blue, while others are a certain shade of green.
am a normal percipient and I succeed in sorting the
pieces of cloth according to their colour. According
to Smart it would be misleading to say that I make a
distinction between the two classes on the basis of
The separation logically
their different colour.

132

precedes the colour-difference, not the
colour difference the separation.
To be a piece of cloth of
colour from another means that I do such
f
things as putting the pieces of cloth in
different
piles.
will be objected, there must be a
real difference between the pieces of blue
and
cloth, otherwise we would not make a difference green
tween them, use words like 'same' and 'different'bein a certain way, and, in general, react
to the
pieces of cloth differently.^^

Armstrong provides Smart with

a reply.

Smart, I take it, would reply to this by saying
that there are real differences in the two sorts
of cloth, differences in their primary qualities,
although probably no simple or clear-cut differences.
These differences affect the very complicated mechanism that is our brain and nervous
system in different ways, causing our differences
in reaction. 12

Were Smart to adopt this defense,

I

think he would eventual-

ly produce an attempt at a primary-secondary quality dis-

tinction very much like Bennett's.

Since Smart is willing

to say that secondary qualities are powers to cause sensa-

tions in human beings, he might be better off to abandon the

view that they are also powers' to cause discriminatory
responses in humans.
For the moment, let us assume that Smart's account
of secondary qualities as powers of objects to evoke dis-

criminatory responses in normal percipients is satisfactory.
We would still not have an adequate means of distinguishing

secondary from primary qualities, for primary qualities,
too, may be described as powers of objects to evoke dis-

criminatory responses in normal percipients.

Paraphrasing
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Smart, we might say that 'This is
elliptoid' means something
roughly like A normal percipient would
not easily pick this
out of a basket of eggs though he would
pick it out of a

basket of dominoes.'

Similarly,

'Jones is six-feet five'

means something roughly like 'A normal
percipient would not
easily pick Jones out of a group of basketball
players
though he would pick Jones out of
I

a

group of second-graders.'

see no obvious problems with these "analyses"
that are not

also problems with the corresponding analyses of
secondary

qualities.

Although to say that Jones' height is

a

matter

of his distinguishability from schoolchildren seems somehow
/

it is not more so than to say that the color of

Petals is merely a matter of their distinguishabil—
ity from lettuce leaves.

Smart might try, as Bennett does, to argue that we
have to have a notion of

a

physical object before we can

have a notion of its powers, but as we have seen, having a

notion of a physical object requires more than knowledge of
its primary qualities,

so this attempt to justify the dis-

tinction would backfire.
a

Nothing yet forbids us to say that

physical object is something that has non-dispositional

secondary qualities and, secondarily, dispositions to evoke
"primary quality" discriminatory responses in us.

J.L. Mackie

,

who, as we have noted, believes that

secondary qualities are dispositions, tries to show that
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primary qualities may not be considered
dispositions also.
He says.

Someone might argue that primary qualities
should be identified with powers. A square too
object
has the power to produce the idea of
squareness in
me in favourable conditions of observation.
mittedly there are such powers. But we also Adneed
a term to refer to the intrinsic
features of their
powers, and it is this job that is done by
the phrase 'primary quality.'
A large part of the
basis of a thing's power to produce the idea of
squareness will, moreover, be its literally being
square, its having a shape-quality which is just
like the shape-quality v/hich we find in the exoeriential content to which the thing gives rise.^^

Mackie argues that powers must have some ground or base.

In

physical objects, the ground of powers consists of the

primary qualities.

Therefore, primary qualities are not

themselves dispositions.

The difference betv/een primary

and secondary qualities, then, is that secondary qualities
are mere pov/ers while the primary qualities are the ground
or base for those powers.

Mackie 's argument is successful only if the dispositional nature of secondary qualities has already been

established by an independent argument.

I

believe that

Mackie appeals to the Resemblance Thesis to establish this,
but the Resemblance Thesis does not entail Mackie 's position.

From the supposition that there is nothing in objects resembling our ideas of secondary qualities it does not follow
that secondary qualities are mere dispositions.

Furthermore,

as we have seen, RT itself cannot be justified.

Here Mackie

unv/ittingly suggests to us an argument to show that secondary
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qualities are non-dispositional

.

We could reason along

Mackie's lines that secondary qualities
must be in objects
as grounds or bases of dispositions
to appear in certain
ways rather than being those dispositions
themselves.
Perhaps Mackie gives us some reason to believe
that

primary qualities are non-dispositional, but
that will not
suffice to support a primary-secondary quality
distinction
like what Bennett and Smart have in mind.

What is needed is

an argument that primary qualities are
non-dispositional

that does not also imply that secondary qualities are
non-

dispositional.
and

I

Mackie does not provide such an argument,

suspect that any such argument would presuppose some

version of the primary-secondary quality distinction independent of and perhaps incompatible with the disposition-

non-disposition distinction.
II

The views about secondary qualities we have dis-

cussed so far have one striking feature in common: they
all say that secondary qualities are essentially disposi-

tional and thereby imply that primary qualities are not.
As we have seen, this dichotomy has been left unjustified.
In each case, we have found no reason why the proposed

criterion for identifying secondary qualities will not
admit as secondary at least some of the traditional primary
qualities.

Part of the explanation for this failure may be
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that none of the philosophers considered
so far has said
much about primary qualities except by
implication.
(in

fairness to Smart, it should be noted that he
does not take
himself to be offering a detailed analysis of
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.)
In "On the Attributes of Material Things,

C.J.

Ducasse presents a fairly well developed version of the
distinction.

He begins by regarding all properties as

essentially causal or dispositional and goes on to make

a

primary-secondary quality distinction that is finer than
any

I

have considered so far.

At the outset, Ducasse dis-

tinguishes between properties and qualities.

qualities are

v/hat are

For him,

often referred to as "perceived

qualities" or properties of sensory states, and properties
are what we have hitherto called qualities.

Accordingly,

I

shall temporarily switch my terminology and discuss

Ducasse 's version of the primary-secondary property dis-

tinction

.

Section

of Ducasse 's paper is headed "Property is

7

an Essentially Causal Concept."

Ducasse opens.

Examples in which the essentially causal nature of
properties is obvious would be fragility, malleability, fusibility, ductility, rigidity, impermeability, etc.
No argument is needed to show that
any attempt to make explicit what such properties
consist in v/ould have to take the form of an acProperties such
count of what is caused when
as these
are describable in terms of kinds
of effects produced in the thing that has them by
certain causes under certain circumstances.!^
.

.

.

.

.

.

,

137

But, according to Ducasse, there are other
properties, for

example, abrasiveness, corrosiveness and
poisonousness which
are describable in terms of kinds of effects
caused
g.r^Qther thing when the thing that has
the property
IS brought into a certain relation to
that other
thing, 1°
and presumably, describable only in those terms.

Ducasse

makes a further distinction: between properties which are
such that the effect in terms of which they

are described

is a physical state and those properties which are such
that

the effect in terms of which they are described is a state
of consciousness,

"in particular, a sensation

It is

this latter kind of property that Ducasse calls secondary

properties.

The former he considers primary properties.

explains

When for instance we speak of carborundum as being
abrasive we mean that friction of it against such
other physical surfaces as steel, glass, etc.,
causes their surfaces to wear away.
The effect
which is caused when such friction takes place in
no way requires for its occurrence the existence
of a conscious being, nor does it for its description in any way require inclusion therein of the
supposition that such beings exist.
Its description can be given in purely physical terms.
But if, on the contrary, a rose is spoken of
as being fragrant
this means that it is such that
under certain conditions its near presence causes
in human beings the state of consciousness desigIn
nated as a pleasant olfactory sensation. ...
such cases, since the effect in terms of which the
property is defined consists of a state of consciousness, it obviously can not occur without the
actual existence of some conscious being, nor can
a description of it be given that does not include
the supposition of the existence of such a being.
,

,

Ducasse also distinguishes real from apparent secondary

He

.
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properties by mentioning
standard observation
conditions

tSe! Sther o^nSt

it’b;

af?h

tLr2ei?Lda^ron“r?r"^°"
grelLfs"^"^'^"^

observer "of“?t

Sfthe

001^^'''

Ducasse means to include
among the primary properties not only the Lockean
primary qualities but also what
Locke calls tertiary qualities.
Locke offers as an example
of a tertiary quality the
power in fire to melt wax. 2 °
Since this power is a power
to produce in objects effects
Which are describable in purely
physical terms, it appears
to meet Ducasse' s requirement
for property primacy.
Ducasse 's analysis incorporates
some aspects of
Bennett's analysis.
For example, Ducasse 's secondary
properties are dispositional, relational
and involve something
mental.
Unlike Bennett, hov/ever Ducasse thinks
that what
distinguishes secondary from primary properties
,

is not all

three of these features, but rather just
the last.

For

Ducasse, all properties are dispositional
and relational,
but not all need involve something mental.
Ducasse 's treatment of the subject is superior to Bennett's
in that he does
not have to try to show that primary properties
cannot be

mere dispositions of objects.

He need only establish that

only in an analysis of secondary properties do we require

reference to states of consciousness or sensations
Ducasse 's position involves three points:

(

1

)

all

.
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properties are essentially causal or
dispositional, that is,
every property is properly analyzed by
means of a subjunctive conditional the antecedent of which
specifies
some set

of conditions and the consequent of which
describes effects

that are produced under such conditions;

(2)

the primary

properties are ones whose defining effects are purely
physical states; and

(3)

the secondary properties are those

whose defining effects are states of consciousness.

For

example, Ducasse says.
To say that glass is fragile for example, is to
say that impact by a hard substance readily causes
it to break; to say that gold is malleable is to
say that hammering causes it to change shape without breaking, etc.^^
,

That the defining effects of fragility and malleability are

physical states is supposed to show that they are primary
properties.

The properties of being irritating or unplea-

sant, however, are secondary properties.

Again, if a person is spoken of as being irritating or an unpleasant individual, this means that
he is such that in certain relations to other
persons, he behaves in ways that cause in them
the feelings called irritation or discomfort

Ducasse 's first point is that every property is to
be analyzed in terms of two other properties.

I

think that

the easiest way to elucidate what Ducasse is doing here is
to begin by recognizing his distinction between properties

which are describable in terms of kinds of effects produced
in the thing that has them and those properties which are

describable in terms of kinds of effects caused in other
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things by the thing that has them.

For convenience I'll

call the first kind of property type-1 properties
and the
second kind type-2 properties.

Type-1 properties are analyzed roughly this way:

where P, C, and E are all properties, a thing, x, has

property

P

just in case were x to have C, it would have E.

Let us call property C the antecedent of the analysis of
P;

we will call E the consequent of the analysis of P.

The

possession of C by x constitutes the fulfillment of conditions sufficient to bring it about that x has

E.

Ducasse

calls the state of affairs consisting in x's having E the

"defining effect" of

P.

We will stipulate that if the state

of affairs consisting in x's having E has no states of con-

sciousness as constituents, then x's having E is a physical
state of affairs.

Similarly, if the state of affairs con-

sisting in x's having E has only states of consciousness as
constituents, then x's having E is a mental state of affairs.

If x's having E is a physical state of affairs, we

will say that E is a physical property.
a

If x's having E is

mental state of affairs we will say that E is a mental

property.

So if x's having E is identical to, say x's

doubling in size, then E is

a

physical property because x's

doubling in size involves no states of consciousness.

If,

however, x's having E is identical to x's feeling embarrassed, then E is a mental property since embarrassment is
a

state of consciousness.
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Type-2 properties are analyzed in a
similar way,
except that E, the consequent of the analysis
of P,

is a

property possessed by some entity other than
the entity
that has P.
Roughly, then, where P, c, and E are properties, a thing, x, has property P just in case
were x to

have C, some thing, y, distinct from x, would have
E.
as with type-1 properties,

Just

if y's having E has no states of

consciousness as constituents, then E is a physical property;
otherwise, E is mental.

Both primary and secondary proper-

ties can be of either type-1 or type-2.

Ducasse's second and third points, then, can be

expressed by saying that the consequent of the analysis of
a

primary property is always

a

physical property and that

the consequent of the analysis of a secondary property is

always a mental property.

Let us then attribute to Ducasse

the following criteria for distinguishing between primary

and secondary properties:
(Dl)

Property P is primary iff (i) it is possible that
there is a physical object, x, such that x
has P
and (ii) the consequent of the analysis of P is
a physical property.

(D2)

Property P is secondary iff (i) it is possible
that there is some physical object, x, such
that X has P
and (ii) the consequent of the analysis of P is
a mental property.
The first question that comes to mind upon encount-

ering Ducasse's views about the nature of properties is

whether it is possible that all properties of material

142

objects are dispositional.
ficulties.

Such a claim presents three dif-

First, if every property is to be analyzed
in

terms of two other properties, it appears
that a really
thorough non-circular analysis of a given
property would be
infinitely long.
If property P is analyzed by means of

properties Q and

R,

and Q and R are analyzed by means of

other properties, and so on, the process will never
reach
an end.

Second, Ducasse's view entails that no property is

simple or unanalyzable

.

There has been, of course, heated

debate on the question of whether certain properties are in
fact unanalyzable.

We should not expect that Ducasse can

effectively silence all such discussion without having dealt

with at least some of the arguments that have been presented
to show that some properties are simple.

Third, the intui-

tion endures that objects must have some non-dispositional
or "manifest" properties in terms of which their disposi-

tional properties are explained, analyzed or accounted for.

Ducasse does not address himself to this issue at all.
Having mentioned this problem,
ignore it.

Although it is

a

I

am now going to

potential source of trouble for

Ducasse's view, the sorts of issues involved are only minimally related to our primary concerns.

Even if it could be

shown that it is impossible that all properties be dispositions, it does not follow that either the traditional pri-

mary or the traditional secondary qualities must be nondispositional.

The non-dispositional properties of objects

.

.
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could be other, perhaps unknown, properties.

There may

still be merit in distinguishing primary from
secondary

properties on the grounds that they are two different sorts
of dispositions.

That is what we are concerned to discover

We turn, then, to an evaluation of

(Dl)

and

(D2)

The first question to ask is what reason there is
to believe that

(D2)

might be true, that is, what reason

there is to believe that secondary properties are properly

analyzed in terms of states of consciousness.

Ducasse's

argument for this contention relies on features of the mean
ings of terms which express secondary properties.
the examples he uses is the word 'green.'

One of

He says that it,

like other terras which express secondary properties,

—

have two or rather three distinct meanings one
physical, one ohysiological and one psychological. 24

Presumably, the "physical" definition of 'green' involves
a description of what happens when light of various wave-

lengths strikes green objects.
the physical sense of 'green,'

Ducasse suggests that in
to say that a tree is green

would then mean that when struck by a beam of
sunlight, it reflects light vibrations of one
of the component frequencies, and absorbs the
others

Although Ducasse does not say much about the physiological
meaning of 'green,' one supposes that, in that sense of
'green,

'

to say that a tree is green would mean that per-

ception of the tree by sentient entities brings about

.
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certain states in the brain and sensory
apparatus of the
entity.

Ducasse's claim that secondary properties are
to be
analyzed in terms of states of consciousness
appears
to

rest solely on his belief that the psychological
meanings of
secondary quality terms are the most common and usual
ones.

The fact is that the original and usual meaning
of
such words as sound, color, heat, etc., is
the psychological one; and that much later these
terms came to be borrowed by specialists to designate physical facts of the same sort as those which
cause in conscious beings the normal sensations of
sound, color, etc., or to designate physiological
events on which depends the occurrence of these
•

.

.

sensations

Ducasse concludes that
to admit this hardly deniable fact is at the same
time to admit the legitimacy of the distinction on
the basis proposed above, between primary and

secondary properties 27
.

Ducasse's argument that the original and usual meanings of

secondary property terms is the psychological one will seem
familiar.

Everyone understands the sort of effect meant when
quinine is spoken of as being bitter. That effect
is a certain psychological state, a certain taste
sensation, perfectly known to everybody in the mere
occurrence thereof, and knowable in no other way.
That what constitutes the meaning which the word
"bitter" has for everyone is that kind of psychological occurrence, and not some physical character
or physiological event, is shown by the fact that,
so far as the v^riter has heard, no one as yet knows
just what the physical character is that distinguishes "bitter" substances from others, nor just
what the physiological events are that distinguish
the effect of those substances on the gustatory
But in spite of
nerves from the effect of others.

'
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that universal, or at all events, nearly
universal,
ignorance, the meaning of the word "bitter"
is universally known. 28

Ducasse is arguing that since people know what
'bitter'
means without knowing what physical effects
bitter things
bring about, 'bitter' cannot mean anything like
having the

disposition to bring about such physical effects and therefore, bitterness is not the same property as the
disposition
to bring about such and such physical effects.

Ducasse

believes a similar argument is available for each of the

determinate and determinable secondary properties

,

so

that it can be shown that secondary properties are not iden-

tical with dispositions to produce physical effects.
This argument deserves a closer examination, but it
is difficult to reconstruct it precisely.

To begin with,

let us assume that there is some physical property that all

and only bitter things have, and let us assume further that
it is the possession of this property by an entity which

accounts for its ability to produce a particular sort of
taste sensation.
I

We can call this property 'property

think that the conclusion of Ducasse

's

B.

argument is twofold

first, since 'bitter' does not mean having property B, the

property of being bitter is not identical to property

B;

and

second, the usual meaning of 'bitter' is the "psychological"
one.

Ducasse gives only one argument for both conclusions.

We can agree that if 'bitter' does not mean having property
B,

then being bitter is not the same as having property B,

.
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even though the two properties may be
coextensive.

We can

concentrate, then, on the question of whether
'bitter'
means having property B.
Ducasse's argument that it does
not, which is also his argument for the
conclusion that the
usual meaning of 'bitter' is the psychological one,
depends
on two claims:

and

(2)

(1)

that everyone knows what 'bitter' means;

that not everyone knows what the physical character

is that distinguishes bitter substances from others.

readily agree that

(2)

is true and focus on

(1).

We can

Ducasse's

reason for saying that everyone knows what 'bitter' means is
that "everyone understands the sort of effect meant when
is spoken of as being bitter."

Suppose we assume

that everyone is familiar with this effect.

This supposi-

tion does not show that everyone knows what 'bitter' means

unless it has already been established that bitterness is
just that "sort of effect," the quality that the taste of

quinine has, that is, that bitterness is a property of sensory states.

Of course, the Ducassean dispositional analy-

sis of bitterness is incompatible with analyzing bitterness
as an occurrent property of sensory states.

to provide us with a reason to believe

Ducasse fails

(1)

It will be objected that the fact of universal

familiarity with bitter tastes must show something about
people's knowledge of the property of being bitter.

I

agree, but it is not altogether clear what it does show.

Perhaps it shows that everyone knows the psychological
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effect by which bitter things are distinguished
from others,
that people know how to pick out those
things which have
the property of being bitter.

I

don't think it shows that

anyone knows what bitterness really is; nor does
it show
that the meaning of 'bitter' is psychological.

Although Ducasse's argument does not prove what he
thinks it does

,

something like it can be used to show that

the disposition to produce 'bitter' taste sensations is not

identical with property B, for someone might perfectly well

understand what the former property is while knowing nothing
of the latter.

For the moment, then, let us grant that all

and only bitter objects have these two distinct properties

and that 'bitter' expresses both of them.
us examine the consequences of adopting

That granted, let

(Dl)

and (D2).

One feature of Ducasse's view that we can note right

away is that it holds that many property-expressing terms

express more than one property.

The word 'green,'

for in-

stance, expresses at least two and possibly three properties.
'Green' defined psychologically expresses a secondary prop-

erty, while 'green' defined physically expresses a primary

property and perhaps, when defined physiologically, expresses a third property, also primary.

The same will be

true for all secondary-property terms.

A second feature, which is a problem somewhat peripheral to our main interests, concerns properties traditionally thought to be neither primary nor secondary.

Tradi-

.
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tional primary- secondary property distinctions
are not
usually meant to be exhaustive, but it is apparent
that

Ducasse means his to be so.

It is worthwhile to point out,

therefore, that as it stands it seems to fail to do
this.
There are many properties of material objects which seem

clearly to be analyzable in terms of both mental states

produced by those things that have them and physical
states produced by those things that have them.

Two that

come to mind are the property of being nauseating and the

property of being sexually arousing.

A complete account of

these properties would include reference to both mental and

physical states.

According to

(Dl)

and (D2)

,

then, neither

of these properties is either primary or secondary.

Ducasse

might claim that 'nauseating' and 'sexually arousing' each
has two senses, one of which is a primary property and one
of which is a secondary property, but such a claim would be

implausible
This problem can be solved with only a small change
in

(D2).

Condition

(ii)

of

(D2)

specifies that the conse-

quent of the analysis of a secondary property must be a

mental property.

We required that a mental property be such

that the state of affairs consisting in someone's having
that property has only states of consciousness as constituents.

This requirement was made in order to express

Ducasse

's

view accurately.

Ducasse never says so explicitly,

but he does suggest that the defining effects of secondary
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properties are psychological only rather than
mixed.
Since
we can find apparent counterexamples to
(D2)
it requires
revision.
Rather than changing the wording of
,

(d 2)

can re-define 'mental property'

,

we

in the following way: we

shall say that E is a mental property only if something's

having E is a mental state of affairs and that a state
of

mental if it has at least one state of consciousness as a constituent.

Now (Dl) and (D2) are exhaustive;

further, they appear to yield the appropriate result that
the properties of being nauseating

,

being sexually arousing

and other "mixed" properties are secondary.

A more serious criticism can be made.

As we have

seen, Ducasse says that all terms traditionally thought to

express secondary properties have two or three distinct
meanings, that is, they express two or three distinct
properties.

If we accept this contention

of Ducasse 's distinction depends on it

— and

— we

the success

have every reason

to believe that the same is true of all those terms usually

thought to express primary properties.
sider the property of being solid.

For example, con-

Since it is one of the

traditional primary properties, Ducasse undoubtedly believes
that solidity should be analyzed in terms of the physical

effects caused by solid things.

An analysis of solidity

would probably include the property of resisting penetration.
We can agree that an essential feature of solid things is

that they are disposed to resist penetration.

However, all
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solid things have other dispositions as well,
most notably,
the disposition to appear solid to sentient
creatures.

An

analysis of this disposition would have as its
consequent

a

mental property; therefore, the disposition to appear solid
is a secondary property.

It is reasonable to suppose that

the name of this property is 'solidity.'

So it looks as

though the word 'solid' expresses two distinct dispositional properties, one primary and one secondary.

Since all the traditional primary properties are
sensible, the terms that express them express at least two

properties.

One of these properties is a disposition to

bring about certain physical states under given conditions
and is therefore primary.
a

The other of these properties is

disposition to bring about, under specifiable conditions,

certain states of consciousness and is therefore secondary.
Hence the terms 'colored,'
'extended,'

'sweet,'

'odiferous,'

'cubical,'

'microscopic,' etc., each expresses at least

two properties, one primary and one secondary.

All of this shows that Ducasse's primary-secondary

property distinction is simply a distinction between dispositions of objects to bring about physical states of
affairs and their dispositions to bring about mental states
of affairs.

There is no doubt that there is such a dis-

tinction among dispositions

,

but

I

do not believe it is one

that we would naturally want to describe as a primary-

secondary property distinction.

I

say this not because

I
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have any qualms about the arbitrary dubbing
of the one kind
of disposition 'primary' and the other
'secondary,' but because Ducasse's enterprise seems to blur the
traditional

primary-secondary quality distinction.

Although linguistic

considerations do not usually play a role in discussions
of
primary and secondary properties, it is natural to
hope that
one feature of a primary-secondary property distinction
is

that It tells us that those properties we intend to express
by the words

'solid,'

'spherical,'

'six feet tall,' and the

like are primary and that those properties we intend to

express by the words 'purple,'
secondary.

'bitter,'

'loud,' etc., are

Ducasse's property distinction does not have

this feature, however.

If Ducasse is correct, all the

property-expressing terms above are ambiguous; they express
both a primary and a secondary property and in some cases,

more than one primary property.
But perhaps we expect too much.

Ducasse's primary-

secondary property distinction involves one rather interesting claim about language.

Although 'hot' and, say,

'round'

each expresses both a primary and a secondary property,

Ducasse contends that 'hot' in its ordinary or usual sense

expresses a primary property; that is, those words usually
taken to express primary properties do so when given their

ordinary senses.

This contention, if true, would not itself

constitute a primary-secondary property distinction, but it

would serve to link Ducasse's version of the distinction to
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the more traditional ones.
a

sturdy or stable one.

The link, however, would not be

First, if we do use words in the

Way Ducasse suggests, it is a contingent fact
that we do.
Second, it is easy to imagine that our word usage
might

change in such a way that we use 'hot,'

'red'

and so on most

often to express physical properties of objects.
Nevertheless, it is worth discussing whether
Ducasse

's

assertion about our linguistic habits is true.

What reasons are there for thinking that words like 'hot,'
'red,'

'smooth,' and so forth are most often used to express

dispositions to produce in percipients sensations of particular kinds?

One reason for thinking so is suggested by

Ducasse 's argument about bitterness.

If we don't know what

physical characteristics distinguish, say, bitter things
from others, it must be that we can't mean to express the

property of having those characteristics by using the word
'bitter.'

The argument would go on to suggest that since

the taste of bitter things is what we know best about them

qua bitter things, we must mean by 'bitter,' tastes such and
such a way to normal humans.
I

Kripke

29

'red,'

do not find this argument entirely persuasive.
has argued that terms like 'hot,'

'loud,'

and

as well as terms for natural kinds and natural phe-

nomena like heat, light and sound, are more like proper
names than is often realized.
'tiger'

He argues, for example, that

is a word used to designate a particular species of
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animal.

Anything not of the proper species

— for

instance,

something that looked like a tiger but had a reptilian
internal structure

— is

not properly called 'tiger.'

Compe-

tent users of the word 'tiger' need not know what
physio-

logical structure it is that distinguishes tigers from

other animals; nevertheless, it is the property of having
just such a structure that the word 'tiger' expresses.

It

may be that the traditional secondary property terms are
like the word 'tiger'

;

that is, they are used to designate

particular properties the nature of which may not be fully
understood.

I

mention Kripke's view because it is an al-

ternative to Ducasse's conclusion that if people use 'bitter'

without knowing the distinguishing physical characteristics
of bitter things, then since they can't mean by 'bitter'

having such and such physical characteristics, they must
have some psychological effect in mind.
I

On Kripke's view,

take it, the person who uses the word 'bitter' without

knowing the distinguishing physical characteristics of

bitter things does not know what property 'bitter' expresses,

although he does’ know how to pick out bitter things.

Some

will find this consequence objectionable, perhaps so much
so that Ducasse's view will seem all the more attractive in

comparison.

There is a good deal of evidence, however, that

Ducasse's contention is false.
First, if the traditional secondary property terms

denote or express dispositions to appear in certain ways to

'
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normal humans, one should be surprised to find
that they are
often used to denote insensible phenomena.
Yet is
is a

commonplace that there are sounds that humans cannot
hear,
but which dogs can, or that there is light we
cannot see.
We say these things,

I

think, without any sense of having

violated the ordinary usage of the words 'sound' or 'light.
Second, if it is true that we use secondary property terms
in the way that Ducasse says

,

we would expect that certain

attributions of properties to objects would be thought correct which in fact are thought incorrect.

Ducasse

's

views are accurate,

For example, if

'purple polka-dotted' v/ould

mean, roughly, disposed under noirmal conditions to produce

round purple visual sensa in normal humans.

If

'purple

polka-dotted' did mean this, it would be correct to say that

photo flash cubes are, when triggered, purple polka-dotted,
since normal people who look at them see purple spots.

But

it is not correct to say this, which shows that our attri-

butions of secondary properties to things rely less on mere

sensory phenomena than Ducasse suspects.

Here is a more

unlikely, yet perhaps more convincing example.

Suppose

there were an apparatus which, although at room temperature
itself, was constructed so that when touched it would pro-

duce in humans the sensation we usually describe as a sen-

sation of warmth.

The creation of such a device is not,

think, beyond present technological capabilities.

Ducasse

's

I

If

view about the ordinary meaning of the word 'hot'
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were correct, then we would naturally describe
this piece
of apparatus as hot.
But of course we would not do
so;

instead we would say that it makes us feel hot, or
some
such thing.
Consider, too, that there are certain very
potent spices which, when ingested, cause us to feel warm
and flushed.

Curiously enough, we do describe such spices

as hot, but when pressed, we would say that this or that

P^^ticular spicy dish is not really hot
cently come from the refrigerator
hot.

— but

— it

may have re-

that it makes us feel

Third, there are some secondary property terms, for

example,

'heavy,'

'hard'

and 'soft' which,

I

think, are

ordinarily defined solely in terms of physical effects

caused by the things that have them.

If the ordinary person

were asked to define these words, he might well, in the
first case, talk about the behavior of objects on scales,
in the second, talk about scratching and breaking behavior,

and in the third, talk about squishiness and compressibility.

If so, then

'heavy,'

and 'soft' express, in

'hard,'

their ordinary sense, primary properties.
I

think that the examples

I

have given show that

Ducasse is wrong in thinking that secondary property terms
are used most often to express dispositions to cause par-

ticular kinds of sensory experiences.

Most of my examples

are of objects which have such dispositions but to which we

would refuse to apply the relevant secondary property terms.
Though

I

think these examples show Ducasse is wrong, they
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raise interesting puzzles about the meanings
of some secondary property terms.
They suggest that we demand that some
physical requirements be met before we attribute
secondary

qualities to objects, but it is not clear what these
requirements are.
Some of these cases suggest that something
like

Kripke's theory may be correct, but

I

am unwilling to com-

mit myself further than to say that they show that
Ducasse's
theory is incorrect.
We have found several problems with Ducasse's attempt
to distinguish primary from secondary properties by analyz-

ing them as different sorts of dispositions.

Although

Ducasse succeeds in isolating two distinct kinds of property,
his distinction bears very little similarity to the tradi-

tional ones.

Insofar as it does resemble Lockean versions

of the distinction it involves claims about word usage that

are probably false and even if true, rather inconsequential.
We should conclude that Ducasse has failed to draw an ade-

quate primary-secondary property distinction.
Ill

Of the attempts at a primary-secondary quality

distinction that have been examined in this chapter, none
has been successful, and their failure bodes ill for further

attempts along these lines.

If one tries to distinguish

primary from secondary qualities on the grounds that the
latter group is dispositional while the former group is not.
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one will have trouble justifying this claim.

if, on the

other hand, one regards all qualities as dispositional,
one
encounters the problem of showing in what way the primary

dispositions differ from the secondary.

Although this

whole family of attempts is unpromising, there is one final
point worth making about them.

These versions of the

primary-secondary quality distinction have implications
about the nature of secondary qualities which run counter to

traditional intuitions about them, and they undermine some

traditional motivations for drawing

quality distinction.

a

primary-secondary

This fact would not be noteworthy were

it not that Locke and Bennett seem unaware of it.

The traditional intuition of which

I

speak is the

belief that secondary qualities are in some way more capricious and evanescent than the primaries.

The Alteration

Argument, discussed in Chapter IV, attempts to provide a

rational foundation for this belief.

I

am not now concerned

with the issue of whether the argument succeeds.

I

am con-

cerned only to show that, given a dispositional account of

secondary qualities, all versions of the argument are unsound.

Yet some philosophers who have offered the Alteration

Argument have simultaneously held

a

dispositional account of

secondary qualities.
In Chapter IV, we discussed at length Locke's por-

phyry argument, to be found at II, viii, 19 of the Essay
The first premise of that argument is:

.
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(1)

When the light is shut off, the color of the
porphyry vanishes.

The argument then proceeds to point out that the
porphyry
has undergone no change and concludes that the
porphyry's

loss of color does not require any physical alteration
in
the porphyry itself.

Discussing a similar argument about taste, Bennett
suggests that it may beg the question.
That argument is not valid.
For in the situation
envisaged, the substance v/ould have undergone a
change, namely a change of its taste.
The corresponding comment in this case would be that the

porphyry has undergone an alteration, namely
color.

a change of

In any case, Bennett has completely overlooked a

glaring inconsistency between the argument and the dispositional account of secondary qualities, and that is that if
the dispositional account is true, then premise

porphyry argument is false.

(1)

of the

According to dispositional

analyses of secondary qualities, the color of the porphyry
is just its disposition to appear red and white when the

lights are on.

When the lights are shut off, this disposi-

tion does not "vanish"; rather, it is no longer being exer-

cised by the porphyry.

So when the lights are shut off, it

is not the case that the color of the porphyry vanishes or

changes.

A dispositional analysis of secondary qualities

entails that to say that the porphyry is red and white is to
say that were certain specified conditions met, it would

159

produce red and white sense-data in a normal
human being.
When these conditions are not fulfilled, it no
longer produces red and white sense-data, but it is still
true that

were the right conditions met, the porphyry would
appear to
be red and white.

The support for premise

is that at

(1)

one time a statement attributing a color to the porphyry is

true and at a later time false.

But the corresponding coun-

terfactual is true at both times.

When the lights are off,

the porphyry is still red and white, if a dispositional

analysis of secondary qualities is true.

Yet immediately

after the porphyry argument we find Locke offering a dispositional account of colors.
It has, indeed, such a configuration of particles,
both night and day, as are apt, by the rays of
light rebounding from some parts of that hard
stone, to produce in us the idea of redness, and
from others the idea of whiteness; but whiteness
and redness are not in it at any time, but such a
texture that hath the power to produce such a
sensation in us.^^

Bennett, in his paper "Substance, Reality, and Pri-

mary Qualities," offers a version of the Alteration Argument

which he calls the phenol argument.
Suppose a world where phenol-thio-urea is unqualifiedly bitter, i.e., tastes so to almost everyone.
Suppose further that a dynasty of world dictators
begins intensive breeding of non-tasters and
gradually allows the tasters to die out.
After a few dozen generations, phenol-thio-urea
is tasteless to everyone living, so that there
are as good grounds for calling phenol-thio-urea
tasteless as for calling water tasteless.
This describes a course of events in which
something (a) is bitter at one time, (b) is tasteless at a later time, and (c) does not itself
change in the interim. ^2
.

.

.

.'
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Again, Bennett thinks the argument begs the question,
yet he

believes it has a certain force and the rest of his article
is devoted to an explanation of that phenomenon.

A similar brief statement of the argument is offered
by Robert Cummins:

"Were everyone to become blind, nothing

would typically or normally appear blue, and hence nothing
"3

would be blue."

T

These arguments are somewhat trickier to deal with

than the Lockean argument.

At first glance, all the pre-

mises seem to be compatible with a dispositional analysis of

secondary qualities, but a closer examination of the phenol

argument will prove that compatibility illusory.
(1)

Phenol is bitter =
Under standard conditions
phenol appears bitter to normal humans.

(2)

If human beings change in such a way that under
standard conditions phenol no longer appears
bitter to normal humans, then phenol is no
longer bitter.

(3)

If, if human beings change in such a way that
under standard conditions phenol no longer appears bitter to normal humans, then phenol is
no longer bitter, then the taste of phenol
changes

(4)

The taste of phenol changes.

(5)

No change is made in phenol.

(6)

The phenol's change of taste does not require
an alteration of the phenol.

The apparent success of the argument is derived from an

equivocation of the expressions 'standard conditions' and
normal humans

.
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On a dispositional analysis of secondary qualities,

which premise

(1)

expresses, the argument is not sound.

Earlier we mentioned the problem of real versus

apparent secondary qualities.
like,

In order to justify statements

"My shirt looks blue now but it's really white" we

have to appeal to standard observation conditions and normal

human percipients.

The phenol argument assumes that if

standards of normality change, then objects can lose certain
of their dispositions, that is, they can actually lose their

secondary qualities without a change in their physical structure.

The defect in this assumption becomes apparent when

we investigate what it means to say, for example, that under

standard observation conditions pine cones appear brown to
normal human percipients.

It means that, given the neuro-

physiological structure of humans at the present time, and
certain facts about the condition of our sun and its relation to the earth, in daylight, the majority of humans have
a sensory idea of the color brown when they look at pine

cones.

Our expressions 'standard observation conditions' and

'normal human perceiver' are linguistic shorthand for a

cumbersome scientific description of things as they are now.
Thus these expressions are implicitly time-indexed to the

interval of time during which conditions have been about the
same as they are now, and if the expressions 'normal' and
'standard' are implicitly subscripted, then they can express

different concepts at different times and are not intersub-

.

1

.

'
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stitutible in all contexts.

premise

We should perhaps re-state

(1)

Phenol is bitter at t =
Under standardt
conditions phenol appears bitter to normal^,
humans

(1')

Since premise

(2)

was derived from premise

premise

(1),

(2)

would have to be re-stated as:
If human beings change in such a way that under
standardt conditions phenol no longer appears
bitter to normal^ humans, then phenol is no
longer bitter at t'.

(2')

Remembering that 'phenol is bitter at t
standard ^

'
'

means that under

conditions phenol appears bitter to normal^,

humans, we see that 'phenol is bitter at

t'

sarily mean the same as 'phenol is bitter at

does not necest

.
'

In the

case under consideration, there is no contradiction in as-

serting that phenol is bitter at t and phenol is not bitter
at t'.

nothing warrants our

If taste is a disposition,

saying that the taste of phenol has changed, for at t',
phenol has the same disposition that it had at t, namely,
a disposition to appear bitter to normal^ humans under

standard^ conditions.

So premise

(3)

changes is not the taste of phenol.

is false.

What

Just as we suspected

all along, all that changes is the humans who taste phenol.

I

have shown that attempts to distinguish primary

from secondary qualities by analyzing secondary qualities
as dispositions of a peculiar sort fail to point to signifi-
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cant differences between the traditional primary and secon-

dary qualities.

I

have tried to provide reasons why any

such attempt will fail.

Furthermore,

I

have shown that

dispositional analyses of secondary qualities are incompatible with certain strong and recurrent intuitions which
form a basis for attempting a primary-secondary quality distinction.

These considerations, it seems to me, are suffi-

cient to show that this version of a primary-secondary

quality distinction is an unattractive candidate for any
further study.

.

.
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I

thG LockGan vigw that sGcondary quali —

tiGs arG in somG way dGpGndGnt on primary qualitiGs was

briGfly discussGd.

At that timG it was concludGd that LockG

says so littlG about thG concGpt of proporty dopondoncy that
it is not Gasy to find a non-circular criterion with which
to express this version of a primary-secondary quality dis-

tinction.

Nevertheless, Locke's intuition that secondary

qualities are somehow dependent on primary qualities suggests
at least three views worth considering:

(1)

that an object's

secondary qualities are collections of its primary qualities;
(2)

that an object's secondary qualities are determined by

or supervenient upon its primary qualities; and

(3)

that

objects possess primary qualities both macroscopically and

microscopically while they possess secondary qualities only
macroscopically.
will be discussed.

In this chapter,
I

all three of these views

shall reject the first on the grounds

that it amounts to a denial of a distinction between primary
and secondary qualities.

The second of these,

I

will say,

is less attractive than the third, which it suggests.

ter discussing the third of these views,

I

Af-

conclude that it

is the most promising of the Lockean-inspired versions of

the primary-secondary quality distinction.
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The first of the three views, that secondary quali-

ties are simply collections of primary qualities, is rela-

tively innocuous.

Someone who holds this view would assert

that an object's having a particular determinate color, for
instance, is just its having a surface composed of a certain

kind and number of molecules arranged in a particular way;
an object's having a particular degree of heat is just its

having a certain level of mean molecular kinetic energy, and
so on.

There are, of course, classic arguments against

identifying secondary qualities with collections of primary
qualities.

One sort of argument asserts that people can

know what it is for an object to be yellow or sweet or foul-

smelling without knowing anything about the molecular structures of objects and that therefore the properties of being
yellow, sweet, or foul-smelling cannot be identical with the

properties of having such and such particular molecular
structures.

Another sort of argument against identifying

secondary qualities with collections of primaries insists
that identical properties must at least be coextensive, yet
there are things that have certain secondary qualities with-

out having the relevant primaries.

After-images, for exam-

ple, can be colored although they do not have light-

reflecting surfaces.
Even if we assume that these and other arguments
fail, the position that secondary qualities are collections

of primary qualities does not constitute a primary— secondary

^
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quality distinction since it is really a complete rejection
such distinction.

This view simply identifies the

two kinds of quality.

The second view, that an object's secondary quali-

ties are in some way determined by its primary qualities

seems closer to what Locke has in mind when he suqgests that

secondary qualities are caused by or dependent on the primary
qualities.

This view involves three claims:

that in

(1)

physical objects, primary quality possession is

a

condition for secondary quality possession;

that the

(2)

necessary

particular determinate secondary qualities an object has are
determined by the particular determinate primary qualities
it has;

view,

and, if it is to be distinguished from the first

(3)

that none of an object's secondary qualities is

identical with any individual primary quality or any set of

primary qualities that the object has.
In a recent paper^ Jaegwon Kim introduces a notion

of supervenience that will be useful in this context.

As

Kim explicates it, supervenience is a relation born by some
families of properties to others.

He says.

For any set M of properties we define M# as the
closure of M under the usual Boolean operations.
]~That is, M# is the set of all properties
constructible from those in M.
We explain supervenience as follows: a family
M or properties is supervenient on a family N of
properties with respect to a domain D of objects
just in case, necessarily, objects in D which
share all properties in N# will also share all
!

.

properties in M#

.

.

.

169

Kim's notion of supervenience can be used as a
replacement
for the more murky notion of property dependency.

We will

say, then, that a property is secondary only if it
is a

member of a family of properties which supervenes on another
family of properties, the members of which are primary qualities.

If we say that secondary qualities are supervenient

on primary qualities, we imply that necessarily, any two objects which share all their primary qualities will also

share all their secondary qualities.

It is most plausible

to take the term 'necessarily' here to express physical

necessity rather than strict logical necessity.

As Kim

points out, the supervenience relation is asymmetric.

If

secondary qualities are supervenient on primary qualities,
then it is possible that two physical objects might share
all their determinate secondary qualities while differing

with respect to their determinate primary qualities.
At first glance it seems false that it is physically

necessary that any two objects which share all their primary
qualities share all their secondary qualities.

Surely it

is physically possible that there be two wooden one-inch

cubes, each weighing one ounce, each stationary, one red and

one blue; that is, two objects which share all their pri-

mary qualities yet differ in color.

In response to this

suggestion it can be argued, however, that if the two cubes
are of different colors, there must be something true of
the surface of one which is not true of the other.

Perhaps

3
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they have been painted with different colors of paint;

presumably blue paint has a molecular structure which differs somewhat from that of red paint

latex or enamel or whatever).

(even if they are both

We suppose, then, that an ob-

ject painted blue has, in virtue of that fact, a different

surface molecular structure from that of an object painted
red.

We should refine our account of secondary qualities

as supervenient upon primary qualities.

We do this, first,

by identifying the set of primary qualities of an object with
its microphysical structure.

identification

v/hen he

Chisholm suggests such an

says,

where Locke speaks of primary qualities of an object,
it may be better to speak of the physical or microscopic structure of the object.
The primary qualities, then, are properties such as being

composed of twice as many hydrogen atoms as oxygen atoms, or

possessing three atoms per molecule.

The refined thesis

about the secondary qualities is that they are those properties which supervene upon the microphysical structures of

objects.

If this thesis is true, then no two objects could

have the same microphysical structure and differ with regard
to their secondary properties.
As plausible as this thesis is, it does not ade-

quately distinguish among properties at the macroscopic
level,

since it is reasonable to suppose that all the tradi-

tional primary qualities of an object supervene upon its

microphysical structure.

In that case, all of the tradi-

,
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tional primary qualities would be secondary.

But must we

believe that an object's size, shape, mass and so forth, as
well as its color, odor and the rest are supervenient upon
its microphysical structure?

lieve otherwise.

It is almost impossible to be-

Kim tries to explain our conviction.

It seems to me that our belief in supervenience is
largely, and often, a combination of metaphysical
convictions and methodological considerations.
Much of our thinking in these matters seems deeply
rooted in the Democritean credo that wholes are
completely determined, causally and ontologically
by their parts, that if you make a replica of an
object by putting it together atom by atom, particle by particle, you get the "same" object.^
.

.

.

It seems that two objects which have the same microphysical

structure cannot differ with regard to any of the properties
we traditionally regard as primary, so the fact of super-

vening upon microphysical structures does not distinguish
the traditional secondary qualities from the traditional

primaries.

If we accept supervenience as the distinguishing

mark of secondary qualities, then being spherical, being
seven feet in diameter and moving at one hundred miles per
hour, no less than being red or bitter or soft, turn out to
be secondary qualities.

While being such and such a size is

secondary, having atoms of such and such a size is primary.
It is easy to see that this way of distinguishing primar—

from secondary qualities produces a list of primaries radi-

cally different from Locke's.

The list of secondaries which

it yields includes many or all of the Lockean primaries.

However, we can preserve the intuition that the

.
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microphysical structures of physical objects fully determine
their macroscopic properties while maintaining a fairly

traditional version of the primary-secondary quality distinction.

Instead of concentrating on the microstructures

of macroscopic physical objects, we turn to the micro-

constituents of those objects, the elementary particles

which comprise physical objects, and consider their properties.

Locke and others suggest that the basic units of mat-

ter of which physical objects are composed have as proper-

ties the traditional primaries but none of the traditional

secondaries.

The elementary particles are supposed to have

shape, size, solidity, mass and mobility while lacking

color, smell, taste, sound, temperature and the like.

VJe

might say, then, that a quality is primary just in case it
is a property which is physically essential to the elemen-

tary particles of physical objects.

The primary qualities

of macroscopic objects are those which it shares with its

microconstituents.

The secondary qualities would be those

physical properties possessed by macroscopic objects but
lacked or possessed only contingently by their elementary
particles.
(PI)

(Pi)

and (P2)

form an attempt to capture this.

Quality Q is primary iff (i) Q is contingent
and either (ii) (x) (y) (x is a physical
object and y is an elementary constituent
of X=,[pJ y has Q) or (iii) Q is a determinate or a determinable of some property
that satisfies (i) and (ii)
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(P2)

Quality Q is secondary iff (i <C> (Ex) (x is
physical and x has Q) and (ii)
(Ex) (Ey)
is a physical object and y is an elementary constituent of x and y lacks Q) and
(iii) Q fails to fulfil condition (iii) of
)

(PI)

.

In Chapter II, property contingency was defined this way:

Quality Q is contingent iff ^(Ex)(Qx) and <>

(Ex) (-Qx)

.

An elementary constituent of an object is one which is not

composed of other things; it is

a basic particle.

An atom,

for example, is not an elementary constituent of any object

since it is composed of a number of other, smaller, entities.
(PI)

restricts the primary qualities to those qualities which

all the elementary constituents of physical objects must

possess, so that having an electrical charge, for example,
is a secondary quality, since not all elementary particles

are electrically charged.

We might want to weaken the cri-

terion for property primacy.

To do this, we must introduce

the rather fuzzy notion of a natural kind of elementary

constituent of objects.

It is fruitless to try to make this

notion absolutely clear; we can perhaps elucidate by suggesting that protons and electrons represent two natural kinds
of elementary constituents of objects.
(P3)

Quality Q is primary iff (i) Q is contingent
and either (ii) (Ex) (EK) (x is a physical
object and K is a natural kind of elementary constituent of x and (y) (y is a memor (iii) Q is a
ber of KC>[^y has Q)
determinate or a determinable of some
property that satisfies (i) and (ii)
)

.

.
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(P4)

(P3)

Quality Q is secondary iff (i) <) (Ex) (x is
physical and x has Q) and (ii) (x) (y)
(x is a physical object and
y is an
elementary constituent of x o
y lacks
Q) and (iii) Q fails to fulfil condition
(iii) of (P3)

counts as primary any physically necessary property of

all the members of any kind of elementary constituent of

any physical object, so that if, say, having an electrical

charge is physically essential to one kind of particle,
then having an electrical charge is a primary quality even
if some kinds of elementary constituents of objects lack it.
It is not clear which of the two pairs of criteria

above is preferable.

One reason for this is that it is

difficult to reason confidently about v;hich properties are

physically essential to various sorts of elementary particles.

Because of this difficulty, it is not easy to argue

for one pair of criteria over the other on the basis of the

results they yield.
(PI)

Nevertheless, one reason for preferring

and (P2) might be the conviction that no property

lacked or possessed only contingently by elementary par-

ticles should be considered primary.

The idea would be that

the primary qualities are in some sense the ultimate ones,
the ones that none of the fundamental bits of matter could
fail to have.

On the other hand, someone might argue that

the primary qualities should be those to which all other

properties are in some way reducible.

If it is the case

that some properties physically essential to some but not
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particlGs are not reducible to sets of those

properties which are physically essential to all elementary
particles, then one might prefer to adopt

(P3)

and (P4).

We can go a short way toward determining the results

of the criteria above by considering what physicists tell
us are the elementary constituents of things and what proper-

ties those particles are thought to have.

Since neither

of these issues is to be considered settled, our conclusions
are tentative.

Among the elementary particles are protons

and electrons.

Neutrons are usually listed among the ele-

mentary particles, yet since single neutrons are in the
habit of breaking down into one electron and one proton
each, it is not clear that neutrons are really elementary.

Both protons and electrons have mass,^ the capability of

motion, solidity, size

electrical charge.

(and therefore presumably shape)

and

Except for the last entry, this list of

properties is remarkably similar to the traditional roll
of primary qualities.

The question remains whether all

these properties are physically essential to the particles

that have them.

One argument that most of them are is that

anything physical has, necessarily, all of the properties
listed above except electrical charge.

If we add that

everything that is physical is so necessarily we can conclude
that these properties are physically essential to elementary

particles since they are metaphysically necessary to them.

Whether having an electrical charge is physically
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6 ss 0 ntial to

anything is a moot point,

Thare are particles,

such as the neutrino, which fail to have electrical charge;
this property is not essential to all physical objects.

Whether in all physically possible worlds protons, for
example, are electrically charged is a difficult issue to

decide.

I

suspect that in all those worlds some sort of

elementary particle or other must have an electrical charge;

whether members of any particular kind must be charged is
another matter.

Employing either

(P2)

or (P4) appears to yield the

result that color, smell, temperature, taste and sound, as
well as a vast array of other properties, are secondary.

There are two reasons why we might think this is so.
First, since none of the traditional secondaries warrants
a

mention in scientific accounts of the nature or behavior

of individual elementary particles, one may conclude on

grounds of ontological economy that the elementary micro-

constituents of objects simply lack these properties.

(I

tried to argue in Chapter III that no similar argument is

available in the case of macroscopic objects.)

Second, the

accepted explanations of the phenomena of color, heat

,

sound, etc., each involves reference to the behavior of very

large groups of particles; singly, it appears, the elemen-

tary particles have not the wherewithal to be colored or

noisy or sweet.

It appears that the traditional secondary

qualities are not physically essential to the elementary
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constituents of physical objects.

In Chapter II,

rejected

I

an attempt to distinguish primary from secondary qualities

which took the former to be essential to bodies and the
latter inessential.

I

argued then that it is reasonable to

assume that macroscopic objects have certain secondary qualities essentially.

At the microscopic level, however, the

scene is different; it appears that the Democritean hint

that the sub-atomic world is colorless, odorless, silent and
so on is correct.

So far, our attempt to distinguish primary from

secondary qualities seems to yield gratifying results.

How-

ever, there are some obvious consequences of the criteria

above that are troublesome.

(Pi)

implies that the property

of being an elementary constituent of a physical object is

primary;

(P3)

implies that the properties of being an elec-

tron, being a proton and so forth are primary.

Both

criteria imply that the property of failing to be
tion is primary.

a

proposi-

Such trivial properties are not usually

considered primary.

I

see no way to block such results

while preserving the idea that the primary qualities are
those which are physically essential to some or all of the

elementary constituents of objects.
In spite of this difficulty, each of the pairs of

criteria above is

a

more promising version of a primary-

dissecondary quality distinction than any we have so far

cussed.

at least
We have been searching for a version with

8

^

6

7
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these two features:

it should have been hinted at or sug-

gested by Locke (and perhaps some other proponents of a

traditional primary-secondary quality distinction)

and it

;

should yield results similar to the Lockean lists of pri-

mary and secondary qualities.

That Locke suggests that the

primary qualities are those possessed by the elementary
parts of objects is beyond question.

A few quotations from

the Essay should make this plain.

Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing
in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce
various sensations in us by their primary Qualities
i.e., by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of
their insensible parts
,

,

.

For the power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or
consistency in Wax or Clay by its primary Qualities,
is as much a quality in Fire, as the power it has
to produce in me a new Idea or Sensation of warmth
or burning, which I felt not before, by the same
primary Qualities, viz. The Bulk, Texture, and
Motion of its insensible parts
.

depend on those primary
sensible Qualities
Qualities, viz. Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion
of parts
.

.

.

.

Similar views are expressed by Democritus and again recently
by J.L. Mackie.

appear to have many
Material things ...
properties; they differ from one another, we say,
But
in colour, hardness, temperature, and so on.
the real differences which these descriptions reflect consist wholly in the arrangement and motion
of tiny particles of which these material things
are composed.
.

.

.

.

At least part of the position we are considering has a long

and rather respectable history.
(P2)

and

(P4)

express the view that secondary
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qualities are those qualities not physically essential to
all the elementary constituents of objects.

In this respect,

they diverge somewhat from Lockean views on the nature of

secondary qualities.

Almost everything Locke says about

secondary qualities entails that they are not essential to

elementary particles; the problem is that he says many other
things about them as well, such as that they fail to resemble

our ideas of them and that they are mere powers of objects.
The present views are mute on questions of idea-property

resemblance and dispositional versus non-dispositional
properties.

However, they are sufficiently similar to some

of Locke’s thinking about primary and secondary qualities

that we can safely say that they are at least suggested
by Locke in his Essay

.

We have seen, however, that the results yielded by
(PI)

and (P2) together and (P3) and (P4) together might

well differ from Lockean lists of primary and secondary
qualities.

We have mentioned two problems:

(1)

it is not

certain in which category the criteria put certain qualities
since it is not certain which properties are physically es-

sential to the elementary constituents of objects; and
(2)

(PI)

and (P3)

judge as primary certain trivial proper-

ties of elementary particles.
The first problem is not so serious that we should

immediately reject the criteria at hand.

I

have suggested

that all of the Lockean primaries are essential to the ele-
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mentary constituents of objects since they are essential to
all physical entities.

at least

(PI)

If this suggestion is correct, then

and (P3) put all the Lockean primaries in their

proper category.

Among other properties which might turn

out to be primary under the criteria we are examining are

having an electrical charge and having
kinetic energy.

a

certain degree of

Suppose an argument could be produced to

show that these two properties and perhaps others, as yet
unknown, are physically essential to some or all elementary

particles, so that they should be counted among the primaries.

We should not take this as constituting a serious

divergence from the Lockean position inasmuch as the expansion of the list of primaries would be a result of post-

Lockean discoveries in the physical sciences rather than a
shift away from Locke's philosophical intuitions.

It is

not surprising that physicists might discover microphysical

properties unknown to Locke and that consequently, the list
of primaries might be lengthened as scientific knowledge
increases.

At the same time, to discover that one of the

traditional secondaries is essential to elementary particles
V70uld indeed be disastrous for the position we are consider-

ing, but,

for reasons alluded to above, we ought to be con-

fident that that will not happen.
The second problem is more serious.

In counting

some trivial properties among the primaries, both pairs of

criteria are defective and, as

I

have suggested, the defect
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may not be eliminable.

Whether the difficulty is grave

enough to warrant complete rejection of the criteria is
debatable.

In Chapter II, we dismissed the view that pri-

mary qualities are those which are essential to macroscopic
objects.

Part of the reason for this dismissal was that

certain trivial properties of macroscopic objects would,
according to that view, be primary.
similar reasons,

It appears that for

(P1)-(P4) ought to be rejected now.

ever, the situations differ in at least one respect.

HowThe

final view discussed in Chapter II had other very serious

defects, while so far, we have found no overwhelming problems with (Pl)-(P4).

A third problem with the two sets of criteria is
that they enormously expand the list of secondary qualities.

Many of the properties on the expanded list, such as being

corrosive and being slippery, are properties that Locke
would undoubtedly call tertiary.

At one point he describes

the tertiaries as secondaries, mediately perceived, so to

count such properties among the secondaries is not a radical

departure from Locke.

Other properties, such as having been

created by Leonardo da Vinci, which are not Lockean terof
tiaries, would also be included in the expanded list

secondaries.

This, of course, does represent a significant

departure from the Lockean results.
In spite of the failure of either

(Pi)

and

(P2)

and secondary
or (P3) and (P4) to yield lists of primary
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id©ntical to Locko's list, it is notablG that both
sets of criteria appear to yield the result that all of the

Lockean primaries are primary and all of the Lockean secondaries are secondary.

succeeded in this.

No other view we have considered has

All of the views we have examined have

more or less reflected some bit of Lockean thinking on pri-

mary and secondary qualities; in that respect, they are all
satisfactory.
sults.
(P3)

But none has been as satisfactory in its re-

Therefore,

I

conclude, either (PI) and

(P2)

or

and (P4) represents the best development of the Lockean

distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

"

.

Footnotes

"Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables
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2
Ibid
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3. Perceiving (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969),
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4. op. cit
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II,viii,10, emphasis mine.
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II,viii,14, emphasis mine.
Problems From Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1976)
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,

,
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9.
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CHAPTER VII
It is t0mpting to believB that one of the reasons

why philosophers continue to talk about Locke's primary-

secondary quality distinction is that they suspect that in

making it, Locke was at least approaching some truth about
the nature of physical objects.

I

have tried to show that

there is no one clear property distinction in the Lockean
texts that we can point to and confidently

identify as the

Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
Rather, there are several independent quality distinctions

suggested in Locke's writings on the subject.

What we have

been searching for is a version of a primary-secondary quality distinction that, one, is at least suggested by Locke,
two, yields results in accord with Locke's, and three, has

defensible implications about the nature or properties of
physical objects.

In short, we have been trying to find a

Lockean version of the primary-secondary quality distinction which merits the attention that Locke's meanderings on
this matter have received.

Many proposals have been discussed and rejected.
They fall into five categories.

First, there are proposals

that the primary qualities of macroscopic physical objects
are essential to them while their secondary qualities are
184
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not.

argued that the chief problem with these lies in

I

the difficulty of establishing that none of the secondary

qualities is essential to the physical objects that have
them.

I

suggested that at least some of the traditional

secondary qualities are in fact essential to physical objects.

Second, there are versions of a primary-secondary

quality distinction which identify the primary qualities
as the "real" properties of physical objects and the secon-

dary qualities as those which are instantiated only by mental entities and which only apparently qualify physical en-

tities.

Besides the fact that this view is not a distinc-

tion among the properties of physical objects, it is,
argued,

I

impossible to defend in a non-question-begging way.

This insight is Berkeley's, not mine.

A third set of

proposals involves the notion of resemblance between

sense-datum and a physical object.

a

The sense-data associ-

ated with the primary qualities of objects are said to re-

semble those objects in some way that the sense-data
argued

associated with the secondary qualities do not.

I

that this suggestion is pretty well incoherent.

A fourth

proposal concerns property changes in physical objects.
It is suggested that objects can gain or lose secondary

qualities without undergoing any physical alteration while
no similar feat is possible in the case of its primary

qualities.

I

dismissed this view on the grounds that it

makes assumptions about the nature of secondary qualities

.
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which, if made explicit, would constitute part of one of
the other versions of the primary-secondary quality dis-

tinction.

Since this fourth proposal cannot profitably be

dealt with in isolation,

I

gave it brief attention.

The

fifth set of proposals discussed takes secondary qualities
to be dispositions.

Then, either the primary qualities are

said to be non-dispositional or they are said to be dis-

positions, but of a different sort from the secondary qualities.

Here

I

argued that it is difficult to find a good

argument to show that secondary qualities are dispositions
that does not tend to show that primary qualities are dispositions, and that if we decide that all of the properties
of physical objects are dispositional, and then try to

divide them up in some likely way, we produce lists of pri-

mary and secondary qualities which are quite diverse from
Although each of these proposals is sug-

Locke's own lists.

gested by Locke, none of them fulfils all three of the cri-

teria mentioned above.

Each proposal either is unclear,

fails to yield acceptable results, or implies something

improbable about some of the properties of physical objects.
Some of the proposals suffer from more than one of these

defects
Each of a final set of proposals is more or less

loosely connected to the notion of property dependency.
of these proposals
others.

I

One

found to be more meritorious than the

The view (roughly stated) that the primary quali-
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ties of objects are those which are physically essential to

their microconstituents and that the secondary qualities of

objects are those of their properties their microconstituents
either completely lack or possess only contingently comes

closest to meeting the standards which informed my entire
search.

The view is certainly suggested by Locke; it

yields results which are comfortably similar to Locke's own;

and it has no bizarre implications about the nature of objects or their properties.
I

wish to point to some other features of this view.

First, it does not entail any of the others

I

discussed.

It

does not imply that secondary qualities are inessential to

physical objects, that they are subjective, that objects
can easily gain and lose them, or that they are dispositional.

It does not imply that primary qualities bear

some resemblance to sense-data that secondary qualities do
not.

Second, the view

I

have endorsed is independent of any

particular theory of perception; most notably, it does not

pre-suppose any version of the much-maligned Representative
theory of perception.

Third, it is pretty much independent

of all of the epistemological tangles that have strangled

fruitful discussion about the nature of physical objects.
Fourth, it defers in an appropriate way to the physicist;
it is he who must tell us what properties elementary par-

ticles have.

Fifth, it leaves open certain questions con-

cerning the proper analysis of the properties of physical
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objects.

Some might consider this a defect;

a virtue.

I

The question whether, for instance,

consider it
'red'

ex-

presses a light-reflecting disposition, a disposition to

produce certain kinds of sensations in sentient creatures,
the property of having a particular kind of surface structure, or all three, quickly leads to other questions which

seem far removed from Locke's major concern, which is to

discover the relationships that obtain among some of the
apparent properties of physical objects.

This is not to say

that Locke's discussion is not too simplistic; nor is it to
say that we should not distress ourselves with these diffi-

cult questions, only that we may take legitimate pleasure
in being able to say something significant about primary

and secondary qualities that does not force a stand on

those other distinct issues.

Finally, the view

I

have en-

dorsed is compatible with and even dimly suggests the at-

tractive position that an object's microstructure fully

determines its macroscopic properties.

This compatibility

frees and encourages us to attempt a reduction of statements

about the macroscopic properties of objects to statements

about the properties of its microconstituents.
It would be gratifying to be able to argue in good

conscience that the view

find most acceptable is the one

I

Locke "really had in mind" and that anything he said to the

contrary represents a momentary lapse of some sort on his
part.

I

cannot do this.

I

believe that Locke was genuinely
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confused about this issue and that his bef uddlement was

caused by his inattention to the mistakes of his predecessors, who freely and carelessly tossed unrelated and some-

times irrelevant ontological and epistemological considerations into their discussions of primary and secondary qualities.

In this project, my aim has been to provide some

historical clarification, to clear away some of the confused
or misleading considerations that have surrounded an impor-

tant strand in the development of philosophical speculation

about the nature of physical objects.

In addition,

I

have

tried to demonstrate that when the deadwood has been removed,
there is something of interest and value to be discovered in

Locke's work on primary and secondary qualities.

.

.
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